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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Title of Dissertation: A comparative study of implementation of existing 
measures for oil spill response in Northern Indian 
Ocean and investigate improvement mechanisms. 
 
Degree: Master of Science 
 
 
Oil is a major source of energy in the world. The geographical distribution of oil rich 
regions away from the major consumers has led to transportation of large quantities of 
oil across the ocean.  The contribution of maritime transport in the total quantity 
estimated to be entering into the sea annually is much lower than the land based 
sources. However, the risk of a large quantity of oil being released in a small area in 
case of a marine casualty leading to disastrous consequences, has forced the attention 
of public and the environmental regulators towards shipping. 
 
The dissertation briefly discusses the harmful effects of oil in the marine environment 
and combat techniques for contextual support to the topic. A short look is taken at the 
history of oil spill response to understand the development of existing mechanism. 
The mechanism for responding to oil spills is a combination of well developed 
response organisation structure, a comprehensive contingency planning, adequate 
equipment & manpower and the supporting legislative framework. The existing 
regulatory mechanism addressing these aspects is summarised to compare them 
against actual implementation by the countries in the region. 
 
A comprehensive examination of the factors affecting the risk profile of Northern 
Indian Ocean towards an oil spill incident is undertaken. Some of the unique factors 
affecting this risk include the concentration of major oil producing nations leading to 
two thirds of the global seaborne oil trade passing across the area on two highly 
congested tanker routes, geopolitical factors which caused the largest oil spill ever in 
the world history during first gulf war and developmental needs taking priority over 
environmental concerns. 
 
The capabilities of the region in oil spill response is examined by dividing the 
countries into three subgroup- South Asia, Middle East and North-eastern Africa and 
investigating the set up provisioned by the government,  The role of private 
organisations and the regional cooperative arrangements is also explored. The 
information is collated and evaluated to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the 
current system in the three subgroups. The existing mechanisms for oil spill response 
in two other sea areas – North Sea and Baltic Sea, have also been summarised to 
compare and contrast the capabilities with the three groups. 
 
The dissertation thus critically analyses the existing capabilities in the Northern 
Indian Ocean and presents a number of recommendations for improvements. 
 
KEYWORDS: Oil Pollution, Contingency Planning, OPRC, Indian Ocean, Oil 
Spill Response, Tiered Response,  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The discovery of oil1 in the 20th century as an efficient and convenient source of 
energy revolutionised the concept of quality fuels for industrialised countries as it 
suited the rapid technological advances especially in internal combustion engines. In 
later years, it became a frontline energy source overtaking coal. However, the 
imbalances in the production and consumption patterns resulted in the requirement for 
movement of large quantities of oil through various regions. The shipping provided 
the most efficient and economical means of transport for this oil and in 2007, the 
global seaborne oil trade was approximately 43 million barrels per day or about half 
of the world oil production (Energy Information Administration, 2009). 
 
Though the initial efforts of exploiting oil did result in oil pollution experienced in 
ports and coastal waters, these were considered as minor risks causing fire hazards 
and damage in ports and insignificant health menace. However, the issue 
progressively gained significance through the early 20th century and efforts were 
initiated to control the oily discharges from the ships and prevent leakages of oil when 
loading, unloading or refuelling at ports (Pritchard, 1987). 
 
The drastic impact of oil pollution on the marine environment and the economic 
dependence of coastal communities on marine industries such as fishing, tourism etc. 
became an increasing problem as greater knowledge about the harmful effects of oil 
was gained. It was also discovered that the recovery and combating mechanisms 
                                                 
1
 The term ‘Oil’ is used generically for crude oil and its derived products. 
 2 
towards such pollution were extremely difficult posing technical as well as practical 
difficulties. The effects of the pollution were, in fact, far-reaching and transgressed 
the conventional boundaries defining losses. The issue has been aptly summarised by 
Ornitz & Champ (2002) quoting ITOPF and USCG as follows: 
 
Oil spills result in tangible, direct losses of life, injuries, damage to 
environment, cargo and vessel, loss of time, loss of consumer base and many 
indirect costs. Oil spills are no longer considered an avoidable accident of 
environmental condition or a function of catastrophic events. 
 
The pollution by oil in the marine environment can be caused by many 
sources .Though the relative contribution of each of the recognised sources may differ 
in distinct marine areas, it is well established that the land based sources2 are likely to 
be the most significant even in marine areas with heavy tanker traffic (GESAMP, 
2001). However, their entry into the sea is much less conspicuous, being released 
continuously in moderate dissolved concentrations and therefore detectable by 
chemical analysis only. In contrast, the impact of a ship / tanker accident releasing a 
sudden large quantity of oil results in catastrophic effects exemplified by sympathetic 
images of oily sea birds on polluted beaches. It creates much larger negative publicity 
despite such sea based activities in general and accidental ship discharges in particular 
making a minor source of oil pollution in marine environment (GESAMP, 2007 & 
GESAMP, 1993).Thus, the media frenzy in highlighting such an incident increases 
the perception of the risk associated with shipping as a major pollutant of the oceans 
by the society.  
 
However, the impact of shipping may also involve many other facets and the issue 
furthermore needs to be considered in the light of steady growth, over the years, in 
both the size and number of vessels particularly the tankers which carry extremely 
large quantities of oil or oil products. A single VLCC is capable of carrying more than 
200,000 to 300,000 tons of oil at one time. Thus, any single spill caused by such a 
ship due to marine accidents, collisions, groundings etc. may be disastrous. Even if 
the risk associated with the occurrence of such an accident is significantly lower, it 
                                                 
2
 Land based sources account more than 50 % share of input of oil into the sea globally, GESAMP, 
1993 
 3 
evokes much greater concern due to inconceivable consequences to marine 
environment in the affected area. 
 
Therefore, this dissertation will focus on the oil pollution threats in the marine 
environment through sea based activities only. These will include maritime 
transportation in general and tankers in particular. The operational and accidental 
discharges from the ships (both tankers and non-tankers), offshore exploration and 
production facilities and other miscellaneous sea based activities handling oil e.g. 
coastal refineries, oil storage facilities and marine oil terminals etc. constitute the 
major categories of pollution originated from sea based activities. Though, each of 
them require a different strategy for addressing the issue of prevention and response / 
control measures, the broad parameters for the overall oil spill response mechanism 
may be deemed to be same in all the cases. 
 
As Ornitz & Champ (2002) have rightly postulated regarding this issue: 
 
The oil spill response is an extremely complex and challenging cross 
disciplinary experience. In the operational decision making process, it 
combines a wide range of issues and activities under emergency response 
conditions that include – the nature of the material spilled, which undergoes 
changes in physical and chemical properties and biodegradation over time, 
local environmental conditions , sensitivity of impacted natural resources and 
selection and effectiveness of response/clean up technologies.  
 
Thus, capability of prevention and response to oil pollution at sea depended upon the 
technical expertise available and the constraints of financial resources. Further, the 
Torrey Canyon incident in 1967 also indirectly fuelled further disparity in these 
methods between the developed and the developing countries.  The focus of 
international community which was earlier more or less on operational discharges of 
oil from ships understandably shifted to the massive levels of oil pollution resulting 
from a shipping casualty (Cormack, 1999). It led to the strengthening of legal 
framework, revamping of compensation regime and capacity building by major 
industrialised nations for prevention and response measures. This also included 
greater research to improve the technologies for more efficient combating methods. 
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However, the developing countries lagged behind in such efforts due to constraints of 
resources and technical expertise. 
 
The experience gained during the years has justified a cooperative approach by all 
parties involved to ensure effective response. These include IMO, national 
governments, industry organisations and expert / research organisations. The OPRC 
Convention, 19903 also promotes the spirit of bilateral cooperation between countries 
and between governments and industry (IPIECA, 2005). 
1.2 Objectives of Study 
 
The study aims to achieve the following: 
(a) Describe the harmful effects of an oil spill on marine environment & 
coastal economy and discuss existing oil spill response techniques. 
(b) Describe the historical development of oil spill response mechanism 
and discuss existing arrangements. 
(c) Examine various threats for an oil pollution incident in Northern Indian 
Ocean and develop the risk profile. 
(d) Identify the criteria for evaluating effectiveness of an oil spill response 
mechanism. 
(e) Discuss the capabilities of individual countries in the Northern Indian 
Ocean in responding to an oil spill incident and role of regional 
cooperative arrangements. 
(f) Identify strengths and weaknesses of the existing arrangements in the 
region. 
(g) Make recommendations for improvement in the existing arrangement 
for oil spill response in Northern Indian Ocean. 
 
1.3 Research Methodology 
 
The study primarily intends to utilize the qualitative approach by initially proceeding 
to collate the available information about the existing arrangements for oil spill 
                                                 
3
 International convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation came into force 
on 13 May 1995. 
 5 
response in the countries surrounding the region. The information anticipated 
included the details regarding the regulatory framework, international conventions, 
national provisions and operational structure, regional agreements, and industry 
initiatives. A literature search is also undertaken to provide an analytical support and 
critical review on the subject. 
 
However, the author was surprised that the area of the Northern Indian Ocean has not 
been provided sufficient attention by scholars and researchers. The literature, 
information and other data about the marine oil pollution issues was also extremely 
limited. The few sources available generally described the technical aspects of oil 
pollution instead of focusing on the administrative or operational set up for 
coordinating response. This posed a difficulty as very few details about many 
countries were available. The author took up the challenge on the advice of the 
professors and the supervisor and decided to generate the information needed for the 
study by directly approaching the concerned organisations. These included maritime 
administrations, oil spill response agencies, national environmental agencies, regional 
organisations working in the field of oil pollution, academic institutions and ocean 
research institutes. The process was quite cumbersome and exhausting which 
involved large correspondences, delicate negotiations, patience and finally convincing 
them to share the information. Thus, the author was moderately successful. However, 
there are still certain areas where insufficient data is available. Further, some of the 
data was shared in private capacity or through informal or unofficial sources, thus it is 
utilised without a reference or citation for ethical reasons. 
 
Finally, the available information is evaluated in respect of the identified criteria to 
formulate arguments towards critical analysis and concluding proposition. 
 
The research work of the dissertation has been divided into five chapters. The topic is 
introduced in the first chapter with preliminary explanatory background. Chapter two 
will present the need for action towards marine oil spills and discuss the international 
legislations and technical details about the fate of marine oil and its harmful effects to 
environment and coastal economy. Chapter three will critically analyse and evaluate 
the risk of oil spills in the Northern Indian Ocean and discuss various factors that 
impinge on the risk matrix. Chapter four examines the capabilities for oil spill 
 6 
response of various countries in the area. The detailed analysis will be undertaken by 
dividing them in three groupings- South Asia, Middle East and East Africa. The 
efficacy of regional initiatives and capability set up by the private entities in this area 
will also be investigated. The arrangements existing for response in two other ocean 
areas are also summarised to compare and contrast the capabilities available in the 
three subgroups to other regions of the world. The concluding Chapter five provides 
recommendations as perceived by the author based on the analysis to help facilitate 
the implementation strategies addressing the deficiencies and weaknesses in the 
system.  
 7 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
MARINE OIL SPILL- IMPACT AND RESPONSE 
 
2.1 Oil – Our Premier Energy Source 
 
Crude oil and other products derived from it have become a major source of energy in 
all the regions of the world which accounted for about 35 percent of the world’s 
primary energy demand in 2005 (IEA, 2007). Although its overall share is likely to 
decrease over the years, it is still expected to account for 32 percent of the world’s 
energy demand by 2030 (SeeTable.1) due to the economic resurgence of China, India 
and other developing economies. 
 
Table 1: World primary energy demand in the reference scenario4. 
 
Source 1980 2000 2005 2015 2030 
Coal 1786 2292 2892 3988 4994 
Oil 3106 3647 4000 4720 5585 
Gas 1237 2089 2354 3044 3948 
Nuclear 186 675 721 804 854 
Hydro 147 226 251 327 416 
Biomass & Waste 753 1041 1149 1334 1615 
Other Renewable 12 53 61 145 308 
Total 7228 10023 11429 14361 17721 
 
Source: World Energy Outlook 2007, International Energy Agency. 
                                                 
4
  Tonne of oil equivalent (toe) is a unit of energy equal to the amount of energy released by burning 
one tonne of crude oil. 
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The important point to note here is that almost all the increase in the oil production 
will occur in the traditional oil rich countries and thus the reliance on imported oil by 
the main consuming regions including the OECD and Asian economies will increase 
substantially (IEA, 2008).The world oil tanker fleet at the beginning of 2009 
comprised of 9159 tankers with 418 million DWT and the tanker order book in 
relation to the current supply, reflecting high demand for oil transportation, stood at 
41 percent (ISL,2009a). 
 
There is a high degree of uncertainty regarding the data concerning inputs of 
quantities of oil into the sea from different sources. The US National Academy of 
Sciences estimated it to be 1.3 million tonnes per year with 30 percent attributed to 
marine transportation including operational discharges from ships (National Research 
Council, 2003). However, the contribution was estimated to be 36 percent out of the 
1.2 million tonnes by GESAMP (2007).More focussed data concerning the causes of 
oil spills resulting from shipping activities is provided by ITOPF 5(2009a) in Figure. 1.  
 
 
Figure 1:Cause of large spills (> 700 tonnes),1974-2008. 
 
Source: ITOPF Handbook 2009 
 
                                                 
5
 The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF) is a not-for-profit organisation, 
involved in all aspects of preparing for and responding to ship-source spills of oil, chemicals and other 
substances in the marine environment. 
 9 
The spills from the shipping accidents, mainly those caused by the tankers, release a 
large quantity of oil and thus pose a much higher threat to the marine environment 
than other sources of pollution. As can be seen from Figure 1, accidents were the 
main cause of the large oil spills with groundings and collisions accounting for 63 
percent of the total incidents. 
 
2.2 Marine Pollution by Oil 
 
UNCLOS Article 1(1) (4) defines pollution of the marine environment as  
 
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the 
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in 
such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to 
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other 
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and 
reduction of amenities. 
 
Thus, it also incorporates the contamination of the seas by oil spilled during maritime 
transportation and other sea based activities. The important aspects of this definition 
are that it is both action oriented as well as effect oriented and provides a broad 
parameter in that the pollution not only exists when the effects really occur, but also, 
when they are likely to happen (Molenaar,1998). The last part of the explanation has 
contributed to the existing mechanisms of the oil spill prevention and response regime 
including the right of intervention by the coastal state (Kennish, 1997). 
 
2.3 Oil- Properties and its Fate in the Marine Environment 
 
 
Although any type of marine pollution involves definite measures towards prevention 
and combating mechanisms, oil, due to its typical constitution and behaviour, presents 
an enormous challenge. The specific behaviour processes that occur after an oil spill 
determine how the oil should be cleaned up and its effect on the environment (Fingas 
& Charles, 2001).The various types of petroleum oils range from light volatile 
 10 
fractions to heavy tar-like residues and have unique characteristics. These 
characteristics influence their fate or behaviour and the harm or damage caused to the 
marine environment (National Research Council, US, Ocean Affairs Board, 1975). 
 
The main physical properties which affect the behaviour and persistence of oil spilled 
at sea are specific gravity, distillation characteristics, viscosity and pour point, all of 
which depend upon its chemical composition (ITOPF, 2009). The details about these 
properties are placed at Appendix ‘A’. When oil is spilled at sea, it spreads and moves 
on the surface of water while undergoing a number of chemical and physical changes, 
collectively termed as weathering (ITOPF Handbook, 2009 & Fingas& Charles, 
2001).Figure 2 represents these different processes. 
 
 
Figure 2 : Weathering process. 
 
Source: ITOPF Handbook 2009 
 
One more important aspect to remember is that the potential human and 
environmental effects of oil spilled depend on not only the quantity and type of oil 
spilled, but also the location and different ecological and oceanographic conditions. 
Thus, a lot of models have been developed to estimate ambient hydrocarbon 
concentrations translating into the overall effects expected ( National research Council, 
2003).However, the predictive models can provide a reasonable assessment of the 
track, location, shape and weathering of oil spill if more detailed data, especially for 
the topography and unique shoreline interaction etc. for any given geographical area 
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is available, which is generally accurate only if it is obtained in real time 
( GESAMP,1993). 
 
2.4 Effects of Oil Spills 
 
 
Oil spills can seriously affect the marine life of the affected area with an inevitable 
loss of marine resources and negatively influence the economy of the coastal 
community. The effects can be divided into two main categories: 
 
2.4.1 Effect of Oil on Marine Ecosystems  
 
The impact of oil on a marine ecosystem is not uniform and varies according 
to the general location or living area of the species- near or at the surface of 
the sea and at the seabed. Though ITOPF (2009) does not agree conclusively 
about any long term harmful effects of oil on marine ecosystems, a lot of 
research in this field suggests a different picture. The principal species known 
to be affected are mentioned below (Boesch & Herchner, 1974): 
 
(a) Birds and Mammals The most recognisable visual image 
attributable to oil pollution by a layman is that of an oily bird dying on 
an oiled beach. There are a large number of birds reported to be killed 
after heavy oil spills due to fouling of their feathers and ingestion of oil. 
The biological systems including their breeding are also found to be 
severely hampered even in the surviving birds and mammals. 
(b) Fish and Fisheries Resources The fish are severely 
affected due to the damage caused by the oil to the eggs and larvae 
apart from the killing of fish trapped in oil. The tainting of commercial 
fish, oysters and mussels has also been experienced. 
(c) Plankton Toxic and sub lethal effects on the plankton 
have been reported to be caused by oil. 
(d) Wetlands The salt marshes and mangroves swamps suffer 
a long-term impact thereby adversely affecting the associated marine 
habitat supporting numerous species. 
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(e) Special Environments  Special environments like Polar 
Regions, coral reefs and estuaries may experience much higher 
degradation compared to normal shoreline. 
 
2.4.2 Effects of Oil on a Coastal Economy  
 
The effects on economy may be short term or long term and may include the 
following: 
(a) Contamination of coastal amenities e.g. recreational activities, 
leading to serious effects on tourism and related industries. 
(b) Fisheries and mariculture in the area is affected by damage to 
equipments, contamination of area and clean up operations. 
(c)  Coastal industries using sea water intake e. g.  Power plants, 
desalination plants etc. may also be seriously affected. 
  
2.5 History of Oil Spill Response 
 
 
The issue of oil pollution from ships came into prominence initially during and 
immediately after the First World War due to highly flammable gasoline discharges 
causing damage and fire to ports. The first efforts towards dealing with these incidents 
were quite basic with regulations by various countries to prohibit the oily discharges 
from ships within a designated zone, 3-mile of territorial waters in Britain in 1918 and 
25-mile zone in the United States as per local regulations in 1921 (Pritchard, 1987). 
The efforts of the British government with the participation of ship-owners, oil 
companies and harbour officials resulted in the introduction of Oil in Navigable 
Waters Act,1922 which was the first attempt of legislating the issue concerning oil 
pollution both in the national and international realms. Further, the cooperation 
between Britain and the United States led to an international conference to address the 
issue in Washington in 1926. Although the conference failed to adopt any convention, 
it laid the ground for the voluntary adoption of a 50-mile prohibition zone by British 
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ship-owners, which was later followed by other European countries as well as the 
United States 6(Pamborides, 1999). 
 
Similar efforts on oil pollution control at international level were attempted in the 
League of Nations in 1935 which, however, also failed but brought forward many 
new concepts including that of penalties sufficient to act as deterrents against acts of 
pollution, provisions of reception facilities by port and some arrangements for 
treatment of oily wastes onboard ships (Mitchell, 1994). 
 
An international agreement on oil pollution finally fructified in the form of the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954 
popularly known as OILPOL7.It was later amended in 1962 and 1969 to cope with the 
technical difficulties to ensure compliance of limits of permitted quantities of oil in 
oily discharges from ships, strengthen the enforcement provisions and the reporting 
requirements (Khee & Tan, 2006). 
 
The Torrey Canyon8  disaster in 1967 brought into focus the need to address the 
accidental discharges from the ships in addition to the operational discharges which 
were the main areas of concern prior to this incident (Sands, 2003). Further, the 
pollution affecting Britain from foreign tanker spilling oil outside the territorial seas 
of Britain also posed problems of jurisdiction for initiating preventive actions by the 
coastal state. This laid the foundation for not only the Intervention Convention,1969 , 
to be adopted providing the right of intervention to a coastal state in such a case, but 
also for many other important aspects to be addressed in respect of liability and 
compensation for pollution damage by ships, prevention of accidental pollution 
through reinforcing design & construction standards, operational procedures and 
training of seafarers ( Franckx, & Basedow & Magnus, 2007).The significant 
consequence was , however, the development of the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973(MARPOL). Although the convention faced 
difficulty in getting support for ratification, it took another series of tanker accidents 
                                                 
6
 100 mile zone was promulgated in United States. 
7
 Adopted on 12 May 1954, the convention was initiated by British Government in the absence of IMO.  
8
 TORREY CANYON ran aground  off England coast on 18 March 1967 in which entire cargo of 
approximately 119,000 tonnes of crude oil was lost 
 14 
including that of Argo Merchant9 in 1976 to prepare ground for a protocol for the 
convention to be developed and adopted in 1978 and for these to come together and 
enter into force (Ehlers & Lagoni, 2006). 
2.6 Regulations Governing Oil Pollution 
 
Although the initial efforts for regulating oil pollution at sea were largely driven by 
the national interests of a few major maritime states, IMO became the forum for 
implementation of the international conventions comprehensively addressing almost 
every aspect of the issue. The important instruments impacting the oil spill control 
regime are mentioned below: 
 
2.6.1 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships, 1973 as amended by protocol of 1978( MARPOL 73/78) This is the 
most important of the IMO conventions on marine pollution and aims to 
achieve  complete elimination of intentional pollution of the marine 
environment by oil and other harmful substances and the minimisation of 
accidental discharges of such substances. It incorporates measures about the 
design standards, operational procedures, surveys, inspections and emergency 
planning and preparedness by ships and other stakeholders to prevent oil 
pollution from ships. 
 
2.6.2 International Convention for The Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 
(SOLAS) This is primarily considered to be maritime safety convention 
but also indirectly impinges upon prevention of oil pollution and safety of 
environment. The design and construction standards for ships cater to tankers 
as well as non tankers and ensure the minimum risk of pollution due to 
accident or during normal operations. The significant part that can be 
considered as directly affecting oil pollution is chapter IX, the ISM Code, 
which specifically incorporates environment protection in the safety 
management system of ships as well as shipping companies and encourages 
active involvement in pollution prevention from ships. 
 
                                                 
9
 ARGO MERCHANT ran aground on Nantucket Shoals, off Massachusetts, USA, on 15 December 
1976, and spilled her entire cargo (28,000 tonnes) of fuel oil. 
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2.6.3  International Convention On Oil Preparedness Response And 
Cooperation, 1990 This was the landmark convention as it provided a 
framework for extensive measures towards not only prevention of oil pollution, 
but also, building up response capabilities and mechanisms to combat an oil 
spill. In addition to reinforcing certain existing provisions in MARPOL and 
SOLAS, it provided for the states to establish a national system for prompt 
response to oil pollution incidents which should include a contingency plan, 
provision of minimum required oil spill combating equipment, regular 
exercises and training of personnel. It also stressed the importance of 
cooperation among the states at bilateral, regional and global level and also 
among the states and the oil industry, port authorities and other stakeholders. 
The importance of technical cooperation and mutual assistance agreements 
and research and development was also emphasised. Thus, it is a premier 
convention for developing a global oil pollution response regime. 
 
2.6.4 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage (1992 CLC) and the 1971 International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage (1971 Fund Convention) as amended in 1992 and 
Supplementary 2003.  These two conventions provide a compensation 
regime for oil pollution damage including clean up costs and are funded by the 
tanker owners and the oil receiving companies respectively. 
  
 2.6.5 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High 
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969 The convention empowers 
the coastal state to  
take such measures on the high seas as may be necessary to prevent, 
mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or 
related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil, 
following upon a maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty, 
which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful 
consequences. 
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Thus, it created a mechanism where the interests of the coastal state are also 
given priority due to the threat of pollution though balanced by a need for 
consultations by the coastal state with all appropriate stakeholders. 
 
2.6.6 International Convention on Salvage, 1989 This convention 
promoted the salvors to undertake an operation with fewer chances of success 
but likely to result in substantially reducing or preventing damage to the 
marine environment. It provided a suitable compensation to the salvor in such 
scenario if he has failed to earn a reward in a conventional way. 
 
According to GESAMP (1993), the problem of marine oil pollution is addressed by 
the current legislative regime in the following ways: 
- Reducing accidents. 
- Reducing the consequences of accidents. 
- Combating major oil pollution incidents. 
- Preventing operational pollution. 
- Protecting special geographical area. 
- Providing compensation. 
- Helping implementation. 
 
2.7 Stakeholders in Oil Pollution Response 
 
It is paramount that various stakeholders contributing towards a successful and 
efficient regime for preparedness and response to an oil spill undertake their 
responsibilities seriously and sincerely. The responsibilities of a few of the major 
stakeholders are discussed in the following paragraphs: 
 
2.7.1 States/Governments The role of governments needs to be considered 
in three different categories: 
 
- Flag State This has a primary role in ensuring safe 
maritime oil transportation and is responsible for establishing and 
maintaining measures for effective application and enforcement of the 
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relevant international conventions to achieve maritime safety and 
environment protection (Ornitz & Champ, 2002). 
 
- Port State This has been considered as providing the last of 
the safety nets protecting human life and the environment from 
accidents and oil spills in the form of port state control. Thus, it also 
has to contribute towards weeding out substandard shipping (IPIECA, 
2005). 
 
 - Coastal State The importance of the coastal state needs to be 
understood with reference to the development of national policies for 
shipping in general and oil pollution in particular , with regard to a 
long environmentally fragile coastline, proximity to major oil 
transportation routes and absence of ports regularly used by ships 
(Molenaar,1998).Despite obvious pressures and constraints against 
instituting such measures ,it has to be proactive in its duty to protect 
and preserve the environment as mandated by UNCLOS. 
  
 2.7.2 Ship-Owners and Operators Operational safety is the 
responsibility of the ship-owners and operators and thus they have to ensure 
strict compliance with all of the measures concerning maritime safety and 
environment protection including design, construction, maintenance, manning, 
operation, and safety management of the ships (Viega,2003). 
 
 2.7.3 Cargo Owners and Charterers Although they do not have a 
direct role in this context, they certainly have an interest in making sure that 
the cargo reaches its final destination safely by ensuring that the ship is 
operated properly. Consequently, they have to ensure a balance between 
quality, price and risk while selecting a ship thereby discouraging operation of 
substandard ships (Khee & Tan, 2006). 
 
 2.7.4 Protection & Indemnity (P&I) Clubs and Insurance Industry They 
have an inherent interest in reducing marine casualties and more importantly, 
any major oil pollution which is likely to result in huge compensation costs. 
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Thus, they are expected to promote good shipping practices including 
compliance of safety management system (Khee & Tan, 2006). 
 
 2.7.5 Classification Societies  It has generally been observed that a 
majority of flag states have delegated many functions regarding survey and 
certification to the classification societies. Thus, in addition to their traditional 
role of classification of the ships, they have a responsibility to ensure the 
promotion of safety culture through stringent observance of the rules & 
standards concerning design, construction and operation of ships (Molenaar, 
1998 and Ornitz& Champ, 2002). 
 
 2.7.6  Oil and Shipping Industry Organizations/Associations The role of 
oil and shipping industry organizations/associations in providing technical 
expertise & guidance and support in oil spill response cannot be discounted. 
They play a leading part in ensuring compliance of existing regulatory 
requirements as well as in developing innovative techniques, systems and 
procedures. The relevant organizations are International Association of 
Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), International Petroleum 
Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA), International 
Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF) and Oil Companies 
International Marine Forum (OCIMF). 
 
 2.7.7  International Maritime Organization (IMO) IMO has played 
an active role in developing instruments to contribute towards framing a 
comprehensive policy for marine pollution issues in addition to encouraging 
technical assistance for capacity building and cooperative arrangements 
among member states. Thus, it has a prominent position in evolving a 
successful and responsive global oil pollution response regime (Molenaar, 
1998). 
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2.8 Oil Spill Response Techniques 
2.8.1 Tiered Preparedness and Response 
 
The oil spill response is usually organized in a structured tiered preparedness 
and response approach to ensure establishment of oil spill preparedness and 
undertaking a response where the potential oil spill incidents are categorized 
in terms of their potential severity and the capabilities that need to be in place 
to respond (IPIECA, 2007). Thus, the concept has been considered as a 
function of size and location of a potential oil spill and has been defined in 
tiers as depicted in Figure 3. 
TIER 1
TIER 2
TIER3Large spill
Small spill
Medium spill
RemoteVicinityLocal
Proximity to Operations
 
Figure 3 : Tiered preparedness and response. 
 
Source: Guide to Tiered Preparedness and Response, International Petroleum Industry 
Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA), 2007 
 
Tier 1  Operational spills at an operator’s facilities who is expected to 
respond with own resources. 
 
Tier 2  Spills likely to extend outside the Tier 1 response area and may 
be larger in size requiring additional resources. 
 
Tier 3  Oil spills causing major impact due to their scale and likelihood 
and demand substantial resources from national and international sources. 
The process of defining these tiers of capability and their boundaries calls for 
a risk management study to ensure appropriate risk mitigation strategies 
(IPIECA, 2008). 
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2.8.2 Oil Spill Response Technologies 
 
The capability to respond effectively to an oil spill is a combination of three 
factors – physical conditions at the time of an accident /spill, suitability, 
capability and availability of technology deployed and the skills, training and 
readiness of an organization / people responsible for combating the spill (US 
Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1990). Thus, the technology 
available provides the limitations, if any, for any oil spill response operation to 
be successful. The oil spill response technology may be broadly divided into 
following categories: 
 
- Mechanical Response According to Doeffer (1992), this 
involves mechanical recovery of spilled oil by a variety of techniques. It 
consists of containment booms which provide a mechanical barrier to floating 
oil by extending above and below the waterline. The clean up operations after 
containment of oil are carried out by removal of oil from the water surface by 
using mechanical devices called skimmers. These skimmers work on the 
principle of gravity (weir type), oleophile (sorbent type), suction, centrifugal 
and submersion and are suitable for different types of oil to be collected. There 
are also specially designed oil spill response vessels capable of operating in 
open ocean (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1990).In 
addition, certain sorbent materials are also used to remove oil from the surface 
of water when oil is free floating and close to the shore or stranded on the 
shore. 
 
- Chemical Response This involves the use of certain chemicals to act 
as surface tension modifiers and inhibit the spread of oil. However, the use of 
dispersants to mitigate oil spills has to be decided taking into account many 
factors including closeness to coast and depth of water. 
 
- In-situ Burning  Sometimes, burning the oil at sea (in-situ 
burning) is also resorted for oil spills in open sea and occasionally on stranded 
oil on shorelines. 
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-  Shoreline Clean-Up When the oil contaminates the shoreline, it 
requires specialized equipments for clean up in addition to conventional 
manpower intensive manual cleaning and thus can be classified as a different 
response technique than a mechanical or chemical response undertaken at sea. 
It also involves the use of bio-agents to accelerate the natural biodegradation 
process of oil. 
2.8.3 Oil Spill Response – Contingency Planning 
 
While the technical aspects of dealing with a spill are clearly important, the 
effectiveness of the response of a major pollution event will ultimately depend 
upon the quality of the contingency plan and of the organization and control of 
the various aspects of the clean-up operation (ITOPF Handbook, 2009). 
However, it needs to be remembered that contingency planning in oil spill 
response involves measures of readiness which include recognizing the need 
for preparedness , allocating resources , gaining participation and then ensure 
continued effort, testing, evaluation and improvement as depicted in Figure 4 
(IOSC,2008).  
 
Figure 4 : Oil spill readiness. 
 
Source: Assessment of Oil Spill Response Capabilities: A Proposed International 
Guide for Oil Spill Response Planning and Readiness Assessments, International Oil 
Spill Conference, 2008 
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Although there are requirements for such plans onboard a ship (tankers and certain 
non-tankers) in compliance with MARPOL 73/78 and the ISM guidelines, the most 
important aspect relates to the emergency preparedness of the various coastal states 
that are expected to build up and maintain emergency response capability for an oil 
spill as per OPRC, 1990. 
 
The process of contingency planning involves three broad steps whereby first, the 
information is gathered, then interpreted and developed into appropriate strategies 
leading finally to the drafting of operational procedures. Figure 5 provides a 
schematic representation of this process. 
Liaison, training, exercising and updating are essential
Operational PlanStrategy DevelopmentInformation Gathering
Risk Assessment
•Oil Properties
•Current with wind 
data
•Sea conditions
•Movements and fate
•Historic data
Environment at Risk
•Ecological
•Industrial
•Amenity
Organisation
Responsibilities 
Communication
•Reporting
•Assessment
•Mobilisation
•Documentation
Resources
Waste Plan
Review
UpdatingResponse Objectives
Spill Scenarios
Tiered Response
Priorities
Strategy Options
NEBA
 
Figure 5 : Contingency planning process. 
 
Source: A Guide to Contingency Planning for Oil Spills on Water, International 
Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA), 2000 
 
Some of the significant features of the plan include the following: (ITOPF; IPIECA 
etc.) 
- Use of risk assessment techniques for defining risk criteria for 
resources, environment etc. 
- Training and review of procedures is essential for continuous 
improvement. 
- Selection and limitation of response techniques to be determined in 
various scenarios. 
- Cooperative approach by all parties for effective response. 
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- Defining termination of clean up operation and final disposal options is 
critical. 
2.9 Oil Pollution Compensation Regime 
 
The peculiarities of an oil pollution response with very large financial costs involved 
in clean up, recouping economic loss and environmental restoration came into 
prominence in 1967 with the Torrey Canyon disaster which defied conventional 
liability and compensation rules for damage. Thus, it acted as a catalyst for the 
development of an elaborate international regime to provide compensation for 
pollution damage caused by spills from oil tankers in the form of the International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,1969 and International 
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage,1971  ( Jacobsson,2003). 
 
2.9.1  International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage, 1969(CLC) --  This governs the liability of ship-owners for oil 
pollution damage and lays down the principle of strict liability and 
compulsory liability insurance. However, they are allowed to limit their 
liability in certain circumstances to an amount related to the tonnage of the 
ship (Faure & HU, 2006). The convention was amended in 1992. 
 
2.9.2  International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 -
 This established a system for compensating the victims of oil pollution 
when they are inadequately compensated under the CLC. It established an 
International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Fund to be managed by an 
inter-governmental organization and financed by contributions from specified 
oil receivers depending upon the quantities of oil received by them after sea 
transport. The convention was amended in 1992 and further a supplementary 
fund was also created in 2003 for additional compensation. The operation of 
the scheme is represented in the Figure 6. 
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Up to about US$306 
million
Supplementary 
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IOPC Fund 1992
Tanker Owner 
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In force from 3 March 2005
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1992 FUND CONVENTION
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1992 CIVIL LIABILITY 
CONVENTION
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(P & I Club)
Levies on oil 
receivers in 1992 
Fund member 
states
Levies on oil 
receivers in 
Supplementary fund 
member states
WHO PAYS SOURCE OF 
MONEY
Up to about US$135 
million, dependent on the 
size of the ship
Up to about US$1 
billion
 
Figure 6 : Three levels of compensation. 
 
Source: Action against oil pollution, International Petroleum Industry Environmental 
Conservation Association (IPIECA), 2005 
 
2.9.3 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil 
Pollution Damage, 2001 The compensation regime for oil pollution 
damage mainly focused only on tankers for oil carried as cargo. However, the 
drastic increase in the size of all types of ships has enhanced the potential for a 
major pollution incident being experienced even due to a bunker oil spill by a 
large non tanker ship. Thus, the International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Bunker Oil Pollution Damage was developed which recently entered into force 
in November 2008. It provides a mechanism for compensation to victims who 
suffer damage caused by spills of oil carried as fuel in ships bunkers. It is 
modeled on the CLC, 1969 maintaining the principles of strict liability and 
compulsory insurance (IMO, 2009).  
 
2.9.4 Oil Pollution Act, 1990 The United States is not a party to the 
international compensation regime discussed in the preceding paragraphs. The 
Oil Pollution Act, 1990 provides the general framework for the same; however, 
individual states sometimes have more stringent oil spill laws (ITOPF, 2009). 
The potential compensation available under OPA, 90 is similar to that of the 
international compensation regime (IPIECA, 2005).  
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2.10 Trends in Oil Spill Incidents 
 
There is no comprehensive global database available which maintains 
statistics of oil spill incidents caused by shipping. However, the database 
maintained by ITOPF covering oil spills caused by oil tankers only is 
generally accepted as a reference by everyone for discussion on trends in oil 
spill incidents over the years and gauges the effectiveness of preventive and 
response measures. Table 2 shows that there has been a significant decrease in 
the number of large oil spills in the last thirty years and 2008 witnessed the 
least number of spills over 7 tonnes. 
 
Table 2 : Number of spills over 7 tonnes. 
 
Year 7-700 
tonnes 
 > 700 
tonnes 
Year 7-700 
tonnes 
 > 700 
tonnes 
Year 7-700 
tonnes 
 > 700 
tonnes 
1970 6 29 1983 52 13 1996 20 3 
1971 18 14 1984 25 8 1997 28 10 
1972 48 27 1985 31 8 1998 25 5 
1973 27 32 1986 27 7 1999 19 6 
1974 89 28 1987 27 10 2000 19 4 
1975 95 22 1988 11 10 2001 16 3 
1976 67 26 1989 32 13 2002 12 3 
1977 68 17 1990 51 14 2003 15 4 
1978 58 23 1991 29 7 2004 16 5 
1979 60 34 1992 31 10 2005 21 3 
1980 52 13 1993 31 11 2006 11 4 
1981 54 7 1994 26 9 2007 10 4 
1982 45 4 1995 20 3 2008 7 1 
 
Source: Oil tanker spill statistics 2008, ITOPF (2009b) 
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The seaborne trade of oil has been growing continuously with the consequent increase 
in movements of tankers. However, despite this increase in oil trading, a downward 
trend in oil spillage has been observed as is evident in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7 : Seaborne oil trade and number of tanker spills over 7 tonnes, 1970-2008. 
 
 
Source: ITOPF (2009b). 
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CHAPTER 3 
NORTHERN INDIAN OCEAN-RISK PROFILE FOR OIL 
POLLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The Indian Ocean has been defined as the area between latitudes 25 degrees north and 
40 degrees south and longitudes 45 degrees east and 115 degrees east (Figure 8). 
However, the focus of this dissertation is limited to its northern part due to specific 
factors highlighted in succeeding paragraphs. The Northern Indian Ocean 
incorporating the Arabian Sea surrounded by the landmass of the Indian subcontinent, 
Middle East Asia and the eastern Africa has unique oceanographical characteristics 
and experiences high levels of seaborne traffic.  
 
 
Figure 8 : Area covered by Indian Ocean. 
  
Source: www.uknetguide.co.uk/.../map_indian_ocean.gif, 2009 
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Prior to the discussion on the risk profile for oil pollution in the area, the rationale of 
risk management has to be understood. 
3.2  Rationale of Risk Management 
 
Risk management involves a process where the risks associated with a particular 
activity or situations are studied in a particular context focussing on development of 
strategies for handling them. These broadly relate to measures applied for assessment 
of risk including identification of hazards & their evaluation and estimation of risk, 
the evaluation of risk and the risk control options and then approaching to effectively 
manage these risks (Elmer, 2003). An effective risk management strategy incorporates 
determining priority of the risks accordingly to their potential seriousness in terms of 
damage caused & likelihood of occurrence and not only developing control measures 
but also implement them by close monitoring thereby achieving the goal of proper 
risk management. Thus, it acts as a tool for maintaining an acceptable level of safety 
(Chantelauve, 2003). 
 
It is important to note that the definition of risk incorporates not only the probability 
of occurrence of a hazardous situation, but also the consequences of that occurrence. 
Thus, all the factors that have an impact on these two domains have to be taken into 
account while developing a risk profile for the Northern Indian Ocean. Thus, the 
various factors will first be discussed in detail. Thereafter, their significance and inter-
relationship with each other will be critically analysed to develop a risk profile. These 
factors are now discussed in detail. 
3.3 Maritime Trade and shipping traffic 
 
The skewed distribution of oil reserves in the world is striking as the major producers 
are not the major consuming nations, thus necessitating transport of large quantities10 
of oil across the globe. The world’s main oil producing countries are located in the 
Middle East and thus a vast amount of oil originating from the oil terminals at their 
ports flows towards the consuming nations transiting the ocean. There are two 
important transportation routes for oil tankers in the Northern Indian Ocean. One of 
                                                 
10
 More than half of the global oil production is transported through oil tankers, Energy Information 
Administration, US, 2007. 
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these routes passes across the Arabian Sea along the Indian EEZ, round Sri Lanka, via 
the southern Bay of Bengal to the Far East. The other route goes through the strait of 
Mozambique, round South Africa to the western hemisphere (Gupta & Qasim, 2001). 
Figure 9 provides details concerning seaborne crude oil trade routes in the world. 
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Figure 9: Movement of oil through sea. 
 
Source: Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit, 2006 
 
It is estimated that about a half to two-thirds of the global marine transport of oil is 
carried along these two tanker routes. Although, generally not many major accidents 
or oil spill incidents have been observed and not too frequently, there have 
nonetheless been a few accidents in the area. However, the operational discharges 
from ships including bilge, bunker and ballast washings also contribute significantly 
towards the quantity of oil entering the ocean. 
 
According to the research carried out by Japan Oceanographic Data Centre on the 
presence of oil slicks in the Northern Indian Ocean, as quoted by Gupta & Qasim, 
2001, about 83.5 percent of the total observations turned out to be positive. The data 
of all observations in the entire Indian Ocean is depicted in Figure -10 (Qasim, 1998). 
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Figure 10 : Observations on oil slicks and other floating pollutants every 5 degree square in 
Indian Ocean. 
 
Source: The Indian Ocean –A perspective, Sengupta & Desa, 2001 
 
This also reinforces the fact that the oil slicks are quite frequent along the tanker 
routes of the Northern Indian Ocean, while south of the equator, there is hardly any 
trace of oil pollution. This analysis fairly corresponds to the density of oil tanker 
traffic as depicted in Figure 1 where the region experiences one of the highest 
concentrations of tanker traffic in the world. 
 
In addition to the tankers, the region also witnesses other shipping traffic transiting 
the area. The conventional traffic has also experienced a drastic increase due to the 
economic resurgence of the surrounding countries especially India and other Asian 
economies in recent years .The growing need for movements of more merchandise 
across the shipping lanes to support the increasing appetite of industries and 
consumers has resulted in escalating the overall conventional shipping traffic in the 
area. This increased traffic combined with existing heavy tanker traffic contributes to 
the high density of shipping in area and further enhances the risk of marine accidents. 
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3.4 Global Hub for Ships Recycling  
 
The region can also be termed as the hub of ship recycling industries in the world with 
major recycling yards located on the Indian subcontinent. The combination of 
increased demand of steel for industries, availability of low cost labour and minimal 
safety and environmental standards has catapulted the region into a major recycling 
destination.  The leading recycling countries in the world are Bangladesh, India and 
Pakistan as depicted in Figure –11. 
 
Figure 11 : Leading ship recycling countries. 
 
Source: A statistical overview of ship recycling, Mikelis, 2007 
 
During 2008, a total of 654 vessels with a tonnage of 11.5 million dwt were reported 
to be broken up which was 58 percent more than that in 2007 (ISL, 2009b).The 
phasing out of single hull tankers from the world fleet as per the schedule adopted by 
IMO will also drastically increase recycling of these vessels in coming years. The 
current economic crisis has also forced the ship-owners to consider scrapping ships as 
an option to ride the bottom phase of the shipping market cycle.  
 
A majority share of these vessels land in the Indian subcontinent for recycling 
transiting the region. It is important to note that , most of such vessels proceed under 
own power on their last voyage to the final destination in a ship recycling yard and 
barely adhere to the safety and environment protection regulations including adequate 
manning required by the relevant international instruments. Thus, it increases the risk 
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of marine casualty in the region due to grounding, collision etc. resulting from the 
operation of these unseaworthy ships. Though, no major casualty or oil spill incident 
has been reported involving such vessels, a number of minor incidents have been 
observed including some near-misses. The countries have undertaken a few measures 
to ensure knowledge of the condition and voyage details of these vessels in advance to 
minimise such incidents. However, these are generally routine, administrative 
procedures and given less priority by the maritime safety and environment protection 
administration. Consequently, these vessels pose a certain risk for being involved in a 
marine accident especially during bad weather or the local monsoon season. 
 
3.5 Ecologically Sensitive Area 
 
The region encompasses unique marine ecosystems supporting rich biodiversity of 
flora and fauna in addition to providing habitats for important species to flourish. 
Though a majority of the world’s mangrove area (over 47 percent) containing 85 
percent of the world’s mangrove species lie in the Indian Ocean, the northern part 
accounts for a significantly less proportion of these habitats. However, there are 
significant mangrove areas located around the coasts of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka   
with scattered areas around the arid regions in the northernmost part close to Yemen, 
Oman and UAE ( Kathiresan & Rajendran, 2004 ).It is important to note that most of 
these regions lie close to the shipping routes transgressing the area thereby posing an 
enhanced risk regarding oil pollution severely affecting these marine habitats. 
 
Further, a number of sensitive and fragile ecosystems e.g. coastal and backwater 
lagoons, mudflats and estuaries are also located around the area (Schwartz, 2005). 
These ecosystems support a fine balance of a variety of species to coexist and 
sometimes also integrate breeding grounds. The area also encloses the low lying atolls 
on the Lakshadweep- Chagos ridge with abundant coral reefs. These areas have been 
found to contain one of the largest numbers of species in the region (McClanahan, 
Sheppard & Obura, 2000). It reinforces their importance not only as an environmental 
conservation issue but also as a major contributor towards coastal economy of these 
areas which are highly dependent on tourism. Thus, any oil spill in the area is likely to 
have a devastating effect over the region’s fragile coastal economies. 
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Since the northern part of the ocean is landlocked from three sides by the continental 
masses of Asia and Africa, any major oil spill in the area is likely to persist for a 
longer duration of time compared to a relatively open ocean in the southern part 
where it may be easier to be drifted away by ocean currents and wind. 
 
Though there are no designated Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs) in the 
Northern Indian Ocean, there are many designated marine protected areas especially 
along the coasts of India and Pakistan. These areas are critical both in terms of 
ecosystem processes and its properties. These are crucial to the health of marine 
ecosystems due to their highly productive capacity to contribute to the food chain and 
support breeding cycles, spawning grounds, migratory corridors etc. (McNeely, 
Harrision & Dingwall, 1994). 
 
3.6 Geographical Factors Affecting the Risk of Oil Pollution 
 
The area comprises a geographical region which is subject to various weather 
phenomena resulting in frequent harsh weather conditions. The effect of the tropical 
monsoon season coincides with the annual cycle of origin of tropical cyclones, thus 
accentuating the combined effect to create extreme weather in the area. Though the 
number of cyclones generated in this region is comparatively much less than other 
regions of the world, their impacts are relatively very high and devastating especially 
close to coast (SAARC, 2008). Incidentally, it has also been observed that during the 
past three decades, the number of severe tropical cyclones (Category 4 and above) has 
increased sharply from 8 percent to 25 percent in the Northern Indian Ocean (SAARC, 
2007). This will definitely result in directly increasing the hazard exposure in open 
areas in ocean as well as in coastal regions where the effects are further compounded 
due to the vulnerability for development of storm surges. The climate change and the 
rise in sea temperatures will lead to more intense cyclones which may occur even in 
regions which have not historically suffered cyclones (United Nations, 2007). Thus, 
the high traffic density in combination   with the landlocked ocean area and the 
probability of increased frequency of severe weather phenomena enhances the risk of 
a major disaster in the region. Incidentally, the 2006 season witnessed 18 incidents of 
grounding or sinking of ships in Indian waters, which demonstrates the gravity of the 
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problem. Details of the incidents are given in Figure 12. It is clear that incidents are 
spread out along the both the coasts with a larger number occurring on the west coast 
of India (ICG, 2007).  
 
Figure 12 : Incidents of grounding or sinking of ships in Indian waters. 
 
Source: Blue Waters, Indian Coast Guard, 2007 
 
Although, these incidents have fortunately resulted in only minor oil spills in some 
cases, the Tasman Spirit oil tanker which grounded off Karachi harbour in Pakistan in 
2003 during severe weather in the monsoon season resulted in a major oil spill in the 
area. 
 
Thus, the vulnerability of shipping traffic to these specific weather and geographical 
conditions reinforces the requirement for a comprehensive strategy for reducing the 
risk by improving forecasting methods, dissemination techniques for weather 
information, arrangements for providing assistance to ships in emergency situations, 
e.g. places of refuge etc. and capacity building in oil spill response in surrounding 
countries. However, there is no common national or regional initiative on these lines 
developed in the region. Therefore, it raises the risk profile of the region against a 
marine casualty in general, and oil spill incident in particular.  
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3.7 Inefficient implementation of pollution prevention measures 
 
It is widely accepted that adequate enforcement of oil pollution prevention measures 
contributes positively in minimising the risk of pollution and its consequences. These 
measures include not only the legislative instruments and policy directives, but also 
effective monitoring activities such as inspections and measuring compliance. 
However, it is important to note that the efficacy of these measures should focus on 
the intentional as well as accidental discharges from the ships. 
 3.7.1 Older and Single Hull Vessels 
 
The countries surrounding the northern Indian Ocean consist of a wide range 
of maritime states with differing levels of marine activities. However, a 
majority of countries have a relatively less stringent inspection regime, both as 
flag state implementation (FSI) and as the port state control (PSC). Thus, it is 
a frequent and prevalent practice by ship-owners to deploy such ships in the 
area which are older and relatively sub-standard ships. These ships are 
generally withdrawn from the highly regulated and stringent areas like Europe, 
to take advantage of the inefficient inspection regime prevailing in the region. 
Though , there have been a few countries like India  which has set an age 
restriction of 25 years for foreign ships entering its territorial waters, most of 
the countries have no such measures to regulate quality of ships in their waters. 
Even in the case of India, the effectiveness of the ban is questionable as it 
excludes many categories of ships including oil and product tankers, and also 
exempts Indian registered ships (WSJ, 2006) 
 
Further, the region has also not witnessed any activity towards regulating the 
single hull tankers transiting the area. Though, there have been basic 
arrangements for adhering to the IMO mandated deadline for phasing out of 
these tankers, the countries have not displayed any proactive approach in this 
field compared to certain countries in Europe e.g. France, Italy, Spain, etc., 
which have banned single hull tankers from entering their ports if they are 
carrying specific types of cargo regarded as worst pollutants (INTERTANKO, 
2009). 
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3.7.2 Provision of Reception Facilities 
 
A major contribution towards reduction of marine oil pollution, including the 
avoidance of many illegal discharges, would be the provision of proper waste 
reception facilities – adequate in capacity & scope, affordable and readily 
accessible (Swift, 2005). The major ports and terminals in the region generally 
provide for a provision for such facilities. However, most of the ports and 
terminals either have a nominal or minimal facilities or lack sufficient 
capacities. Further, there are considerable shortcomings in enforcing the 
provisions regarding illegal discharges by the port states thereby providing no 
deterrence to the crew of the ships against such intentional acts or discharges. 
Thus, there have been concerns expressed recently about the number of illegal 
discharges from the large volume of shipping within the region (Ingole & 
Sivadas, 2007). 
 
It is evident that there is a direct relationship between the adequate 
provisioning of accessible facilities for reception of oily wastes at ports and 
terminals and the incidents of intentional discharges at sea. However, it has to 
be remembered that a majority of shipping in the region including the tankers 
is a transiting traffic and do not enter into the ports located within the area. 
Thus, the contention of the argument for sufficient reception facilities has to 
be critically evaluated and weighed against this traffic not being affected by 
such efforts. Incidentally, the positive concerns towards this issue to prevent 
illegal discharges are likely to contribute towards raising awareness about the 
environment protection and generate an encouraging response on such matters.  
It would also promote the development of a mechanism supporting prevention 
of such acts by all ships including inbound, outbound or transiting traffic in 
the area. 
3.7.3 Lack of Strong Enforcement Mechanism 
 
The region does not have any national or coordinated mechanism or agency 
that effectively monitors the intentional discharges, investigates the defaulters 
and undertakes enforcement of sanctions or penal actions. For example, in the 
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case of the United States, the Coast Guard is highly effective and empowered 
to take such measures and is authorised to even impose certain monetary fines 
on the polluters (Cohen, 2004). Most of the countries in Europe, Japan and 
Australia also have regular surveillance arrangements by their respective 
agencies to monitor the area around their coasts for any oil spills including 
illegal discharges by ships. Any oil slick located at sea is traced back to the 
defaulting ship and processed for legal or monetary sanctions. Such 
coordinated acts incorporating regular patrol and follow up not only create a 
deterrence effect on subsequent defaulters but also contribute in inculcating a 
sense of fairness towards those ships that comply with the accepted 
environment friendly policies and regulations. Though there are national 
agencies and organisations responsible for oil spill response in respective 
countries in the region, most of these neither possess technical resources nor 
are legally empowered to initiate these proactive measures.  
3.8 Developing Economies – Competition for Resources 
 
Though the economic prosperity of a country or a region does not directly affect the 
risk profile for an oil pollution incident, it may be considered as an influencing factor 
while evaluating the consequences part of the risk equation utilized for undertaking 
risk assessment in the area. Thus, a similar incident of oil pollution may have vastly 
different consequences at two different places depending upon the effect it causes on 
the economy of the coastal community and the resources available for mitigating its 
effects. 
 
The Northern Indian Ocean region is surrounded by countries which are largely 
developing nations with many of them struggling to balance the need of resources for 
basic developmental need and effectively meeting the environmental concerns. They 
have a large population which is depending on the sea and coastal areas for their 
survival. Millions of people (more than 2.5 million in India) are directly or indirectly 
engaged in the production of fish with a significant percentage of fishermen in the 
world located in this region (FAO, 2008). 
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Further, Maldives, a small island country, totally depends on coastal tourism for 
major part of the revenues to fund its national budget. In addition, other countries in 
the region also have a significant tourism industry engaged in coastal tourism with 
millions of people involved in these activities. Thus, any major oil spill incident will 
result in not only an environmental disaster in the region but also in devastating effect 
towards these economic activities. Infact, the economic effect may have a longer term 
implication than the environmental one as, even after the restoration of the 
environment, the lack of resources would severely restrict the revival of coastal 
communities towards sustainable economic enterprises. Though, the relatively 
prosperous regions are also likely to suffer enormous damage, the effects would be 
much lesser due to availability of resources and diversified economic activities. In 
contrast, most of the population in these developing countries under risk are involved 
in subsistence activities and have limited or no alternative source for their livelihood 
in case of any deterioration of sea and coastal areas. Thus, such an incident can wipe 
out the livelihood of millions of people. 
 
The lack of resources also severely restricts quick and efficient response strategies in 
case of an incident thereby accentuating the negative impact and delaying restoration 
and recovery.  The provisioning of necessary infrastructure for dealing with such 
contingency would suffer due to high cost involved and lack of technical expertise.It 
is obvious that the constraints of resources also have a significant effect in overall 
perception of the society about the risk involved in a particular scenario depending 
upon its relative importance. Thus, the issue of environment protection in general and 
marine oil pollution in particular is usually not considered as a priority area vis-a–vis 
the requirement of resources for critical problems such as education, healthcare, food 
security and child welfare. The key validation regarding poverty alleviation taking 
precedence over other activities is illustrated by Table 3 which lists the human 
development index ranks of the selected countries in the area along with the 
percentage of population below the national poverty line. 
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Table 3 : Percentage of population below poverty line & HDI index rank. 
 
Sr no. Country Population below 
poverty line 
HDI Rank 
1. Bangladesh 40.0 140 
2. India 28.6 128 
3. Maldives NA 100 
4. Pakistan 32.6 136 
5. Sri Lanka 25.0 99 
6. Yemen 41.8 153 
 
Source: Compiled by Author with data obtained from Human Development report 
2007-2008, United Nations Development Programme, 2007. 
 
 This competition for resources negatively influences the provisioning of funds and 
efforts towards essential but relatively less popular activities such as pollution, 
environment protection, etc.  
 
The overall effect of these circumstances impinges on the risk matrix and 
progressively increases the risk in respect of an oil pollution incident by improperly 
amplifying the consequences domain. Moreover, the intricate web of interdependent 
factors creates a situation where the economic prosperity of the state plays a 
considerable part in developing a mechanism for oil pollution prevention and 
response in a strange but unique way. 
 
3.9 Geo-Political Factors Affecting Oil Pollution Risk 
 
The region encompasses distinctive geopolitical factors that also generate an influence 
in the development of risk profile of an oil pollution incident. The area towards the 
eastern boundary comprising South Asian countries of the Indian subcontinent is 
politically stable and does not possess any significant issues of concern. However, the 
countries in the northern part comprising Middle East are relatively volatile with not 
only internal but also external political tensions prevailing. There have been a number 
of major events that impacted shipping traffic in the area over a period of time. One of 
the most important and uncharacteristic development was experienced during the 
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closure of the Suez Canal first in 1956 and then for a much longer period between 
1967 and 1975 (Suez Canal Authority, 2009). Thus, all the shipping traffic in the area 
was routed around the African continent thereby affecting traffic density in the 
Northern Indian Ocean. Though, the political and diplomatic considerations have 
changed significantly in today’s context, the fragile relationship between Israel and 
the Arab world even today, point towards the possibility of such closures again. As 
much of the tanker traffic passes through the canal, any disruption in the canal 
passage in turn affects the shipping in area. Apart from these closures of the canal due 
to political tensions involving the host country, Egypt, the prolonged war between 
Iran and Iraq in the 1980s also resulted in the traffic in the canal being affected 
considerably. Incidentally , the region still remains in a fluid state , if not similarly 
volatile as earlier, with  political and diplomatic tensions and stand-offs quite 
common among neighbouring countries .  
 
The intricacies of the geo-political factors transgressing environmental arena were 
specifically evident during the First Gulf War in 1991 when Iraqi soldiers dumped 
thousands of tonnes of oil from a loading dock in Kuwait into the Persian Gulf. This 
irrational act resulted in one of the largest oil spills ever in the recorded history 
(Ingole & Sivadas, 2007). The effects of this spill were experienced largely off the 
coasts of Saudi Arabia but the effects were felt throughout the region, beyond the 
Gulf area even up to the Indian coast and created long term ecological, environmental 
and economic consequences. 
 
The region also experiences an unusual situation in respect of Somalia, where no 
political governing administration retains control over the state. Thus, the state is 
functioning without an effective government for the last many years, thereby leaving 
a large coastal area and surrounding waters without any control and monitoring. This 
gap in the implementation of maritime safety and environment protection measures in 
such a large area definitely affects the adjoining areas in the region in ensuring 
compliance of such measures. 
 
The current situation in Somalia has resulted in another problem affecting the 
maritime field. There has been a sudden jump in the incidents of piracy and hijacking 
of vessels transiting the area and now it has the notoriety of being the hot spot of 
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maritime piracy. The incidents have become so common that many shipping 
companies have started considering routing of their vessels around the Cape of Good 
Hope and avoiding the area completely. Thus, these events have succeeded in creating 
an effect in influencing the traffic pattern in the region in the short term. Though, 
these incidents have not resulted in any casualty to the ship resulting in collision, 
grounding or sinking, the frequent use of heavy military style weapons like rocket 
launchers, heavy machine guns, grenades, etc. by these pirates might sometime result 
in damage to the ships hull resulting in leakage of bunker or cargo oil leading to 
catastrophic results. 
 
The circumstances become more complicated due to notable existence of terrorist 
activities in some countries of the region. Though lying dormant in recent years, the 
bombing of USS Cole at Aden harbour in Yemen in 2000 ( Figure 13 )and of the 
French oil tanker Limburg in the Gulf of Aden in 2002 highlights the risk of such 
events.  
 
Figure 13 : USS Cole at Aden harbour after the terrorist attack in 2000. 
  
Source: www.globalsecurity.org, 2009 
 
Any such terrorist attack on a super tanker might result in disastrous consequences in 
the area. The strategy of a terrorist organisation to engage in an activity with 
maximum effect for a small effort to have a global publicity compliments the 
selection of targeting maritime shipping, especially a VLCC, in area. 
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Figure 14 : Geo-political factors influencing risk of oil pollution in Northern 
Indian Ocean. 
 
Source: Author, 2009 
 
The combination of politically and diplomatically fragile relationships among 
neighbouring states, a failed state, piracy infested waters , conflict prone area and 
probable terrorist activities create unique geo-political conditions unlikely to be 
duplicated anywhere in the world as shown in Figure14. Though , the probability of 
any of these factors is quite low or even negligible in certain cases , the high costs 
involved in the consequences of even a single event definitely forces us to take it into 
consideration for developing risk matrix in the area. A single event has the potential 
to topple the balance of the risk equation evolved after careful research of all 
conventional factors as these asymmetric factors provide an uneven and lopsided 
weightage towards determination of the risk. 
3.10 Developing Risk Profile by Analysing Contribution of Various Factors 
 
The discussion in the preceding paragraphs highlighted some of the key parameters 
that influence the development of risk profile for an oil pollution incident in the 
Northern Indian Ocean. These factors traverse through a wide domain for 
identification of hazardous situations that impact on the probability of the occurrence 
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and the severity of the consequences of such an incident. Though some of these 
factors seem to suggest an independent profile or existence, most of them actually 
define a relationship of interdependency with a few others. Thus, the analysis of the 
overall situation needs to address the issue in the context of individual aspects 
correlating with the combination of these factors. 
 
The most striking aspect among the information available about the region is the 
existence of one of the busiest shipping traffic area in the world. This is specifically 
evident from the two major tanker routes passing through the area. It is also 
undisputable that both of these routes together carry a significant proportion of oil 
coming out from the ports of the largest producers of oil in the world located in the 
Middle East. Hence, the presence of a large number of tankers transiting the area at 
any given time certainly contributes in enhancing the risk of any marine accident. The 
tanker traffic is again combining with the other normal shipping in the area to create 
even more dense shipping in the region, thus, further enhancing this risk. However, 
the risk for the marine accident needs to be distinguished from the risk of oil pollution. 
The two are definitely interrelated but are not the same. The risk equation regarding 
probability and consequences can be applied in such a scenario to determine the 
difference between the two. In this case, not only there is high probability of a marine 
accident occurring in the area due to high traffic density, but also the presence of a 
disproportionately large number of tankers among these ships drastically increases the 
probability of an oil pollution incident. Incidentally, such an incident is likely to be 
much more severe due to the likelihood a large quantity of oil spilled at sea from the 
oil cargo tanks compared to the situation when a non-tanker ship is involved in such 
an accident. Thus, due to this cumulative effect, the risk for oil pollution becomes 
relatively much higher than the risk for a marine accident in the area. 
 
However, this discussion does not preclude the contention that traffic density alone 
cannot be considered as a predominant factor in causing an accident at sea. It can 
surely be argued that there are other contributing factors equally or at least 
significantly important which influence the risk of an accident. Thus, we have to 
consider these factors in our area now to determine how much they contribute towards 
increasing or decreasing this risk. 
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The most important of these factors is the weather conditions experienced at sea. The 
vagaries of the monsoon season and the tropical cyclones have been discussed earlier 
which generate severe weather conditions annually in Northern Indian Ocean. Despite 
the contention of an increase in the harsh weather conditions due to the increase in the 
frequency of the severe tropical storms in the recent years, it needs to be considered 
against the fact that the average weather conditions experienced in the region are 
relatively less severe than those prevailing in other oceanic areas. The root of this 
argument is based on two main aspects which define the weather conditions at sea – 
generation of cyclonic circulations leading to very rough weather and the average 
wave height experienced in the area.  Let us look into these aspects more closely to 
draw a justified inference. Firstly, the region generates the lowest number of cyclones 
compared to any of the other oceanic regions (less than 4 percent). Further, even after 
the increase in the frequency of severe cyclones reported in recent years, there are still 
only 7 such cyclones (category 4 and above) experienced in the last 15 years. In 
comparison, the Southern Indian Ocean generated 50 such cyclones in the same 
period (SAARC, 2007). The number of severe cyclones generated in various oceanic 
areas in the last 15 years is shown in the Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Change in number and percentage of Hurricane/Cyclone. 
 
 
Basin 
1975-1989 1900-2004 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
East Pacific Ocean 36 25 49 36 
West Pacific Ocean 85 25 118 41 
North Atlantic 16 20 25 25 
South West Pacific 10 12 22 28 
North Indian 1 8 7 25 
South Indian 23 18 50 34 
 
Source: South Asian Disaster Report, 2007 
 
Secondly, the average wave height experienced at sea in the region is relatively quite 
low at 2 to 3 metres which indicates that the general sea conditions prevailing in the 
area are moderately calm and not severely rough except during cyclonic disturbances. 
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In comparison, the south Indian Ocean experiences the biggest waves on the planet 
averaging up to 7 to 8 metres with occasional waves twice this height. The northern 
Atlantic Ocean also witnesses waves of average height of 5 metres (Anthoni, 2000). 
The average heights of the waves in various regions of the world are depicted in 
Figure 15.  
 
Figure 15 : Average heights of the waves in various regions of the world. 
 
Source: Oceanography: waves theory and principles of waves, how they work and 
what causes them, Anthoni, 2000 
 
Thus, it is observed from Figure 15 and Table 4 that the northern Indian Ocean is a 
relatively calm sea area where the weather and sea conditions are way below being 
abnormal and harsh for a major part of the year. These conditions may worsen for a 
short duration of time during an occasional (but not very frequent) storm generated in 
the area. Hence, the weather conditions do not significantly contribute to the risk of an 
oil pollution incident in the region. 
 
The quality of the shipping in terms of sub standard ships operating in the area is also 
one of the important considerations in determining the risk of an accident. It can be 
regarded as an independent factor as well as having a certain influence on the traffic 
density. The presence of major ship recycling centres in the Indian subcontinent leads 
to a constant flow of ships on their last voyages passing through the area. Most of 
these ships certainly can be classified as fairly unseaworthy creating a hazardous 
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situation. With the increase in the number of these ships due to the requirement of 
phasing out of the single hull tankers, the problem is expected to become more 
compounded in the short term. However, the threat posed by these vessels has to be 
examined and evaluated with respect to their impact on the overall risk situation in the 
area. It is estimated that over 50000 ships pass through this region every year. On the 
other hand, only a few hundred vessels (less than 1 percent) transit the area bound for 
the recycling yards. Further, most of these ships carry a quantity of fuel oil barely 
sufficient to meet the demand for undertaking their last voyage and do not in itself 
pose a risk of a large oil spill in case of an accident due to their un-seaworthiness. 
Thus, they can cause significant damage only if they are involved in a major collision 
with other vessels operating in area causing damage leading to oil pollution from 
these vessels. However, with such a negligible presence, the probability of such an 
event is extremely low, though consequences of which may certainly be much higher. 
Thus, it is fair to consider the risk contribution by these vessels to be reasonably low. 
 
The other aspects which impinge on the quality of shipping are the comparative 
lacuna in inspection regime by maritime states, limitation of policy initiatives to root 
out old and substandard ships and insufficient enforcement powers. These issues are 
related not only to the technical expertise and legitimacy of intent of various countries 
involved for substantive action, but also the economic constraints and developmental 
pressures not related to maritime interests. The reality of environment or maritime 
issue being sidelined for other priority areas needs to be accepted for these developing 
countries. Thus, the overall impact of such a situation is certainly a negative influence 
on the risk profile in this case. It is especially true in the case of intentional discharges 
by ships due to insufficient capacities in reception facilities or flaccid enforcement 
mechanisms. The combined effect can be considered to pose a relatively medium risk 
for an oil spill incident in the area. 
 
The existence of ecologically sensitive area in the region has been discussed and the 
hazard to these areas cannot be always quantified in terms of economic and social 
costs. The comparison of the area with other oceanic areas of the world brings out that 
the biodiversity and marine ecosystems existing in the area conform to the world 
average. Though there are no PSSAs designated in the region, and the presence of 
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mangroves or other such sensitive habitats are also limited, the long term impact of 
any oil spill on them makes for a high risk criterion.  
 
The presence of unique combination of geo-political factors in the region cannot be 
compared with any other region of the world. The inter-relationship of these factors 
creates a high risk, though with low probability but disastrous consequences, for a 
situation of oil pollution in the area. The mishap prone area due to conflicts, piracy or 
terrorism substantially poses a challenge for the development of any risk criteria due 
to highly uncertain circumstances as well as consequences. However, despite this 
difficulty, it is safe to consider it as a medium risk situation in our context. 
 
Thus, the overall risk profile for an oil pollution incident can be developed by 
summarising the discussion in the Table 5. 
 
Table 5 : Development of risk profile. 
 
 Risk Classification 
 
Probability 
Severity of 
Consequences 
Minimal Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic 
Frequent Low Low Medium High High 
Probable Low Low Medium High High 
Occasional Very Low Low Medium High High 
Remote Very Low Very 
Low 
Low Medium High 
Improbable Very Low Very 
Low 
Low Medium High 
Incredible Very Low Very 
Low 
Very Low Low Medium 
 
Source: Clinical Risk Assessment Criteria, Retrieved from World Wide Web, 17 
August 2009, events.london.nhs.uk/events/uploads/appendix_c.doc 
 
The data can be evaluated against the concept of ALARP (as low as reasonably 
practicable) matrix which determines the level of risk acceptable to the society. The 
concept provides for the need for undertaking measures for reducing the risk to as low 
as reasonably practicable by taking risk reduction or control measures.  
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Figure 16 : ALARP Matrix. 
 
Source: http://www.aribaproject.org, 2009 
 
Thus, Table 6 and Figure 16 show that the risk of oil pollution incidents falls in the 
ALARP or tolerable region. This necessitates the requirement for the countries in the 
region to implement measures for reduction of this risk. These measures include the 
provisioning of oil spill response capabilities in addition to implementing adequate 
preventive measures to reduce the risk of oil pollution. Thus, an efficient oil spill 
response mechanism acts as a suitable risk control and reduction system enabling 
reduction of overall risk of oil pollution in area.  
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CHAPTER 4 
EXISTING MECHANISMS – OIL SPILL RESPONSE 
IN NORTHERN INDIAN OCEAN 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The Northern Indian Ocean has been found to have a medium risk for an oil spill 
incident with a few distinct zones of relatively higher risk as discussed in Chapter 3. 
There are a number of measures that have been undertaken by the surrounding 
countries in the region to minimise this risk. These include certain preventive 
measures to influence the probability of occurrence of an oil spill and active measures 
for response in combating it to limit its consequences. The present chapter addresses 
the issue of the existing mechanisms for response. However, certain preventive 
measures that have a direct bearing on the response arrangements have also been 
included in the discussion. These include legislative framework, and liability & 
compensation regime. 
 
As discussed earlier, there is a lack of data, information and literature concerning the 
Northern Indian Ocean especially regarding oil pollution. Hence, the author attempted 
to address the issue of insufficient data by directly approaching various sources of 
information. These included maritime administrations, oil spill response agencies, and 
national environmental agencies, regional organisations working in the field of oil 
pollution, academic institutions and ocean research institutes. Although the author 
was moderately successful in his endeavour, some of the information was shared in 
private capacity and not available in public domain. Thus, it will be used without a 
citation or reference for ethical reasons. 
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The area of study encompasses a number of countries which have distinct 
requirements of oil spill response depending upon the risk, availability of resources 
and capabilities. Thus, it is necessary to divide the area into certain subgroups to 
discuss the effectiveness of response arrangements. There are two approaches that can 
be considered. Firstly, the countries can be grouped into three categories – large oil 
producers, large oil consumers and others. The main oil producers located in the 
Middle East have a different requirement for response arrangements influenced by a 
greater risk than a major consumer like India. However, this approach does not 
provide sufficient flexibility for a critical discussion on all aspects influencing the 
capabilities of response. Further, it does not address the domain for regional or 
bilateral cooperation which are essentially organised on the basis of geographical 
locations. Thus, it is preferable to turn to our second approach in dividing them into 
groups selected on geographical basis - South Asia, Middle East and North East 
Africa. This will certainly be more appropriate for discussion on local parameters 
influencing the area. The list of major oil spills from tankers, experienced in the 
region is placed in Appendix ‘B’ for reference. 
 
The author has identified that in order to successfully respond to any type of 
emergency, including an oil spill incident, there are four essential requirements: 
(a) Well defined organisational structure with clear designation of 
responsibilities for launching response. 
(b) Comprehensive plan addressing all contingencies. 
(c) Availability of adequate equipment and other resources. 
(d) Technical expertise in terms of adequately trained personnel. 
 
Hence, the response capability of various countries has been examined under these 
broad parameters with certain other relevant issues included in some cases which 
affect the overall response capability. These include the legislative framework to 
support response infrastructure and financial issues especially the recovery of costs in 
case of liability by a third party. 
 
The discussion initially focuses on the capabilities of national arrangements of the 
individual countries and later includes the support provided by the industry or private 
organisations and the regional cooperative arrangements. Finally, the arrangements 
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existing in two other oceanic areas- North Sea and Baltic Sea have also been 
summarised to compare and contrast the capabilities existing in these regions with 
those in the Northern Indian Ocean. 
 
4.2 Oil Spill Response Measures in South Asia 
4.2.1 India  
 
India is the largest country in the region with a coastline of 7500 km. It is a 
leading oil importer and also has some offshore oil development and 
production facilities located around the coast. The country has been in the 
forefront in initiating necessary measures to prevent and control marine oil 
pollution. The responsibility for implementing these measures and 
coordination of response activities in case of an oil spill was entrusted to the 
maritime administration i.e. the Directorate General of Shipping. The agency 
was tasked basically to implement MARPOL provisions and had minimal 
response capability. Thus, the coordination of response arrangements was 
transferred to the Indian Coast Guard in 1986 for efficient response. It 
provided an impetus in improving these arrangements. Although there was no 
international obligation for developing a National Oil Spill Contingency Plan, 
such plan was drafted in 1988 which identified the requirement of cooperation 
among various agencies and delineating of their responsibilities with 
nomination of a lead agency for overall coordination. The plan was approved 
in 1993 by the government and Indian Coast Guard was nominated as the 
Central Coordinating Authority for marine oil spill response (ICG, 2006).Thus, 
India was fortunate to have a system already in place to meet the requirements 
of the OPRC developed later by IMO and ratified by India. 
 
Presently, India has a well developed national plan for oil spill contingencies 
integrated with the local and regional plans developed for specific ports, 
industrial facilities and other areas, which are regularly updated. The response 
is organised in a tiered response arrangement. The local ports, oil facilities and 
industrial organisations have the responsibility of setting up the capability to 
respond to a Tier-I oil spill in their area of up to 700 tonnes under the 
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supervision of the coast guard.  The coast guard has developed a capacity to 
respond to a Tier-II oil spill of up to 10000 tonnes with three suitably 
equipped independent pollution response teams located in Mumbai, Chennai 
and Port Blair respectively to cater for any such incidents around the west 
coast, east coast and Andaman & Nicobar Islands respectively. It has a 
dedicated fleet of ships, helicopters and aircraft to support such operations and 
incidentally is shortly inducting three large specialised pollution response 
vessels in its inventory. It has developed arrangements to solicit cooperation 
and assistance for tackling a Tier-III oil spill in Indian waters and is also 
planning to augment its own capabilities. A large stockpile of equipment is 
also maintained by private organisations in the country (ICG, 2006). 
 
The country also has a high technical expertise in this field and has a well 
developed capacity for undertaking training of personnel. It is well supported 
by periodical exercises at local, regional, national and international level. 
 
India is also a party to the CLC 92 and FUND 92 and has successfully claimed 
compensation in a few cases. It has encouraged the resource agencies in 
contributing resources to build up capabilities. There has been no major oil 
spill experienced by the country recently, the last being the 40000 tonnes 
spilled by Maersk Navigator in 1993 off A & N Islands (ITOPF, 2009c). It is 
also a party to other relevant IMO instruments such as Intervention 
Convention and Salvage Convention. 
 
Thus, the country has a well defined organisational structure, trained 
manpower, sufficient combat capabilities for a medium spill, efficient 
contingency planning and a supporting legislative framework to launch an 
effective response to an oil spill incident. 
 
4.2.2 Pakistan 
 
The other major country in the region, Pakistan, presents an interesting picture 
as it brings out typical constraints in developing an efficient oil spill response 
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infrastructure in a developing country. The country has been quite proactive in 
ratifying the IMO instruments concerning marine oil pollution and even 
ratified the OPRC and Intervention Convention much before India. However, 
it has been quite slow to take steps to implement these   measures in national 
domain. The issue of oil spill management was not addressed in the national 
policies and legislations developed for environment protection in the country. 
Although the issue of marine pollution was sometimes included, it lacked 
specific focus on oil spill response mechanisms (Mian & Bennett, 2009). 
Further, there was no central agency designated to coordinate the response to 
such an incident. A host of agencies empowered under different environmental 
acts on marine pollution were authorised to take action in this field. For 
example, the Pakistan Environment Protection Act, 1997 designates Pakistan 
Environment Protection Agency, Pakistan Merchant Shipping Ordinance, 
2001 empowers DG Ports and Shipping while Maritime Security Agency Act, 
1994 authorises DG Maritime Security Agency to take measures in respect of 
marine pollution which seems to include marine oil pollution (Mian & Bennett, 
2009). 
 
However, the lacuna in the oil spill response capabilities was exposed during 
the worst environmental disaster in Pakistan’s history when an oil tanker, 
Tasman Spirit, grounded off Karachi harbour in Jul 2003 spilling more than 
30000 tonnes of crude oil at sea. A large area was affected by the spill which 
resulted in severe and long term ecological as well as economic impacts. The 
national oil spill contingency plan was at the draft stage during this period and 
yet to be approved by the government. Thus, there was an initial confusion 
regarding organising response with complications arising due to various 
individual local, national organisations claiming jurisdictions in coordinating 
the response. It resulted in delay for launching response. The operations were 
also hampered due to lack of technical expertise and limited equipment and 
resources. The clean up operations involved huge costs. However, it was 
found that these costs could not be recovered as the country was not a party to 
any of the liability and compensation instruments of IMO concerning oil 
pollution. 
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This incident led to serious thinking on the issue and thus, the national 
environment policy developed in 2005 specifically included oil spill 
management for the first time in national policy and also stressed the need to 
develop a national oil spill contingency plan. It also called for initiating active 
legislative and operational measures to implement relevant international 
instruments and set up response capabilities. Thus, the issue was fast tracked 
and Pakistan ratified the CLC 92 in 2005 and the National Marine Disaster 
Contingency Plan was formulated and approved by the government in 2007. It 
consisted of three parts and also included the oil spill contingency plan with 
responsibility of coordination clearly designated to Maritime Security Agency 
(MSA) (SDMC, 2008). 
 
Thus, the incident positively contributed in catapulting the issue of marine oil 
pollution into national prominence by highlighting the lacuna in the system for 
response and assisting in addressing these lacunae through policy initiatives. 
This has significantly improved the response capabilities. Presently, there are 
limited resources and equipment available with the MSA and the port 
authorities. The training efforts for personnel of various organisations 
involved in response have also commenced to build up expertise. Although no 
details about capabilities of response are available, it is understood that the 
ports have been directed to maintain Tier-I capability with the support of oil 
handling companies operating therein while MSA caters for the Tier-II 
response. A few exercises have also been conducted at national level to 
validate the contingency plan and fine-tune the response organisation structure. 
Despite recent proactive approach, the country is yet to ratify the FUND 
convention. 
 
4.2.3 Sri Lanka 
 
The country lies close to an important shipping lane at the point of 
convergence of maritime traffic routes. Due to this strategic location, the issue 
of marine pollution was accorded due importance in national policy and Sri 
Lanka was quite active in ratifying relevant IMO instruments including 
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MARPOL, CLC, FUND and Intervention Convention. Further, not only it was 
prompt in implementing these regulations in a separate Marine Pollution 
Prevention Act in 1981, but also created a specialised agency, Marine 
Pollution Prevention Authority (MPPA) to undertake steps in ensuring 
operational implementation of these measures (MPP Act, Sri Lanka). However, 
specific measures towards creation of any infrastructure to respond to an oil 
spill incident were not undertaken. Incidentally Sri Lanka is yet to ratify the 
OPRC. However, the first national oil spill contingency plan was prepared by 
MPPA in 1995 ,revised in 1998 & 1999 and finally approved by the 
government in 2000 (MPPA,2009).  
 
However, a need was felt to revise the plan again due to changes in national 
regulations on disaster management which included a major oil spill as a 
national disaster and also to adapt the current plan to the requirements of a 
regional plan under development for South Asian Seas Programme under the 
UN Environment Programme (UNEP). The revision was undertaken in a 
project of Institutional Strengthening of Oil Contingency Management 
(INSTCOM) funded by the Norwegian government which was completed in 
2003 (SDMC, 2008). A new Marine pollution prevention act was promulgated 
in Jan 2009 to strengthen the MPPA which was renamed as Marine 
Environment Protection Authority (MEPA) (MPPA, 2009). 
 
The response mechanism presently in place is developed on the tiered concept 
with three levels of response. However, the demarcation of these 
classifications have been done as – up to 50 tonnes for Tier –I , 50 to 100 
tonnes for Tier-II and more than 100 tonnes for Tier-III. The local agencies e.g. 
ports, oil terminals are mandated to have an approved contingency plan along 
with appropriate response equipment and resources to launch Tier-I response. 
They have to take command of such operations and keep the MEPA informed 
about the developments and request assistance in case it develops into Tier-II 
or III. 
 
Tier-II spills are handled by MEPA with support from local facilities for Tier-I. 
However, large spills requiring Tier-III response will be dealt with mainly by 
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requesting international assistance in augmenting national resources. The 
organisational structure is clearly defined with MEPA being the lead agency 
for coordinating response up to Tier –II independently. As the Tier-III spills 
are most likely to be treated as a national disaster, the response coordination 
will be taken over by the Disaster Management Committee (DMC). However, 
the MEPA is most likely to work as operational coordinator under the DMC 
due to its expertise in this field. Thus the command and control of response 
operations is well defined and documented in the plan to avoid any confusion. 
 
The national plan addresses contingencies of a small oil spill and therefore 
there is limited response equipment available in the country. Most of the 
equipment is located with the Sri Lankan Ports Authority and the Ceylon 
Petroleum Corporation, which is more suited to be used in sheltered waters in 
and around the port area. Thus, an oil spill incident far away from the coast 
still needs to be tackled utilising minimal resources. Further, the MEPA does 
not have any vessels and aircraft available to launch response operations and 
has to depend upon a host of resource agencies for these resources which are 
not specifically suited for these operations. The response is cooperated by the 
MEPA through the three regional centres established at Hamanthota, Galle 
and Kaluthara other than the national centre at Colombo. 
 
There are no major oil spills experienced in Sri Lankan waters. However, 
regular training of personnel is undertaken in-house by MEPA and also by 
utilising expertise available at regional level. The contingency plan is also 
validated by periodic exercises. 
 
It is among the few countries in the region which has implemented the CLC 
and FUND conventions in their national legislations. Thus, there exists a 
mechanism to recover the liability costs towards oil spill clean up and 
restoration expenses. 
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4.2.4 Maldives 
 
Maldives is an archipelago consisting of a chain of small low lying islands. 
Due to its special vulnerability, it has a need of placing a high priority on 
environmental sustainability and environmental protection to be incorporated 
as an essential element in the national development planning process. 
However, the specific factors uniquely influencing this island nation focussed 
the attention on issues such as climate change, global warming and sea level 
rise in the context of environment protection and to a certain extent pollution 
generated due to human developmental activities. The absence of any major 
port also resulted in the issue of marine oil pollution being forced out of the 
national policy. Thus, the National Environment Action Plans (NEAP), the 
first of which was formulated in 1989 and the second in 1999 also did not 
address this issue despite the overall objective of the plans being – to protect 
and preserve the environment of Maldives (Maldives Embassy, US, 2009). 
However, with the Environment Protection and Preservation Act, 1993, it also 
addressed the area of intentional discharges by ships for the first time with 
provisions of fine against defaulters. 
 
Maldives was, however, an active member in IMO and was among the first 
few countries in the region which has ratified the important instruments 
related to oil pollution except the OPRC and Intervention convention, which it 
has not ratified yet. 
 
The country currently does not have a national oil spill contingency plan and 
has included the development of such plan in the third NEAP (2009 to 2013) 
to be completed by mid-2010 (NEAP 3 Maldives,2009). It also does not have 
any capability for oil spill response and relies on the capabilities available at 
the regional level in the area in neighbouring countries. The only port in the 
country visited by ocean going vessels also does not have any such capability. 
Although it has not witnessed any major oil spill, it seems to be the most 
vulnerable country in the region against such incident. 
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4.3 Regional Cooperation in South Asia for Oil Spill Response 
 
The cooperation among the various countries in South Asia was provided a formal 
platform by the UNEP Regional Seas Programme which encouraged the development 
of regional agreements for combating marine pollution in cases of emergency even 
prior to the OPRC coming into force in 1995. Thus, the Action Plan for the South 
Asia Regional Seas Programme was adopted in 1995 which addressed the issues 
concerning environmental management with specific emphasis on development and 
implementation of national oil spill contingency planning (SASP, 2009). Although the 
regional oil and chemical marine pollution contingency plan was drafted and 
approved by the high level meeting held in Colombo in 2000, it is yet to be 
implemented as it has not been activated by finalisation of necessary MoUs of 
cooperation. Thus, there is no formal cooperation arrangement in the region on oil 
spill response. 
 
However, there have been some instances of assistance provided at the regional level 
by countries in the region. In 2006, India responded to the request of Sri Lanka for 
assistance to combat an oil spill off Galle harbour due to the sinking of MV Amanat 
Shah and provided a pollution response task force comprising two large vessels with 
integrated helicopters and aircraft along with pollution response equipment and 
personnel (ICG, 2009).  During the Tasman Spirit oil spill in Pakistan, India offered 
assistance in terms of equipment and personnel for oil spill response. However, the 
offer was not utilised by Pakistan. India also regularly undertakes training of 
personnel in combating oil spills for Maldives and Sri Lanka and conducts periodic 
exercises with them. Thus, the informal set up exists for cooperation among the 
countries towards launching joint operations to combat any major oil spill in area. 
However, it is purely voluntary and case specific in the absence of any institutional 
mechanism. 
 
4.4 Industry / Private Capabilities for oil spill response 
 
In India, most of the major ports have developed Tier-I response capabilities with 
provision of necessary equipment. In addition, around 20 operators of offshore oil 
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facilities have also set up Tier –I response infrastructure (ITOPF, 2009c). Some of the 
major oil production companies e. g. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation have also made 
arrangements to utilize equipment of oil spill response from the industry cooperatives 
and other contractors located in East Asia and other location globally. Thus, a 
significant quantity of equipment is available with the private organisations in India. 
However, in other countries except Sri Lanka, where a nominal capability exists with 
Sri Lankan Ports Authority and Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, very limited quantity 
of equipment is available with the private entities. 
4.5 Strengths and Weakness of Response System in South Asia 
 
The region presents an interesting mix of implementing mechanisms for addressing 
environmental concerns related to marine field including the arrangements for 
responding to oil spill incidents. The major factor influencing the development of 
these mechanisms seems to be the relative importance of oil pollution as a policy 
issue in national domain and the availability of adequate resources for building up the 
required equipment and resources. The fact that the region did not experience any 
major oil spill for many years also significantly contributed to this lack of awareness. 
The major incident in respect of Tasman Spirit oil spill in Pakistan definitely has a 
positively effect in bringing the issue into prominence and forcing critical 
examination of these arrangements by the countries. The analysis of the discussion in 
preceding paragraphs suggests the following strengths and weaknesses: 
 
Sr.No Strengths Weaknesses 
1. Contingency Planning 
The major country in the region, 
India has a sufficiently well 
developed contingency planning 
supported by regularly updated 
national plan and related local level 
plans. 
Contingency Planning 
National contingency plan in 
respect of Pakistan has recently 
been drawn up while that of 
Srilanka is pending revision. In both 
cases, there is lack of well 
developed local plans connected 
with the national plan. Maldives 
does not have such a plan in place. 
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Sr.No Strengths Weaknesses 
2. Tiered Response Capability 
India has developed a capability to 
respond to Tier –II spills up to 
10000 tonnes while Sri Lanka has 
capability up to 100 tonnes. 
Tiered Response Capability 
India is the only country that has the 
capability to respond to oil spills of 
more than 100 tonnes. 
3. Equipment and Resources 
India has an adequate stockpile of 
specialised combat equipment 
including vessels and aircraft to 
launch effective response. 
Equipment and Resources 
Very limited equipment and 
resources are available in Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka with no specialised 
vessels or aircraft. No resources are 
available with Maldives. 
4. Competent National Authority 
All countries except Maldives now 
have a clearly defined command 
structure in place with a designated 
national authority for oil spill 
response. 
Competent National Authority 
The nascent arrangements in 
Pakistan is yet to stabilise while in 
Sri Lanka, the role of DMC in Tier-
III oil spill with declaration of a 
national disaster is confusing. 
5. Training and Exercises 
India has a high level of expertise 
for training and undertakes regular 
exercises at local, national and 
international level. 
Training and Exercises 
Maldives has no capability. Pakistan 
is in the process of setting up the 
required mechanism while Sri 
Lanka has limited training expertise 
and national exercises. 
6. Regional Cooperation 
Good precedence exists for informal 
cooperation among the states for 
joint operations. 
Regional Cooperation 
No formal agreement exists for 
cooperation among the states for oil 
spill response. 
7 OPRC 
India and Pakistan have ratified. 
OPRC 
Sri Lanka and Maldives have not 
ratified. Although Pakistan has 
ratified, it is in the process of 
implementing it  
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Sr.No Strengths Weaknesses 
8. Other Issues 
India and Sri Lanka have ratified 
relevant IMO instruments and 
incorporated in legislative 
framework.  
Other Issues 
Pakistan and Maldives are yet to 
ratify FUND convention. Pakistan is 
developing the legislative 
framework for implementation of 
ratified conventions. Maldives does 
not have any such framework 
currently. 
 
4.6 Oil Spill Response Measures in the Middle East 
 
The Middle East region is the most important area in the Indian Ocean region in 
respect of risk of oil pollution as a major portion of seaborne oil trade is originated 
from this area. The response arrangements towards an oil spill incident in various 
countries in the area are summarised as follows: 
4.6.1 Iran 
 
Iran is one of the major oil producers in the region and is also among the few 
countries which have been in the forefront in addressing the oil pollution 
issues. It is a party to all the relevant IMO instruments including OPRC and 
has actively pursued measures to implement them in the national legislation. 
However, despite being a net exporter of oil, it has only recently ratified 
FUND, 92 which is yet to come into force for the country. The practical 
implementation of the oil spill response measures took a relatively longer time. 
Although there were arrangements set up in the ports with the help from oil 
handling companies to combat any oil spill, there was no consolidated plan 
either at regional or at national level with the responsibility divided between 
various agencies. However, during 2002, a national plan for oil pollution 
preparedness, response and cooperation was framed and approved by the 
government which was developed with the support of the IMO. Thus, the 
Ports and Shipping Organisation (PSO) was designated as the national 
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authority responsible for coordinating response in Iranian Waters (PMO, 
2009). 
 
The response is organised through a National Coordination Centre set up 
under PSO. A network of provincial coordination centres in each province has 
also been set up for efficient implementation of the plan. In addition, all the 
governmental and non governmental bodies using the sea and the coastal areas 
are also required to establish local centres for oil pollution response under 
information to the national authority. While the national centre is run by the 
PSO, the provincial centres are managed by the relevant provincial authority 
which is generally the Directorate General of Ports and Shipping in that 
province. The local centres are managed by the agencies themselves under 
supervision of provincial authorities. Each authority is mandated to have a 
separate contingency plan for its area of responsibility, which is fully 
integrated with the plan at next higher level (PMO, 2009).  
 
The response is modelled on Tiered concept. The spills up to 50 tonnes are 
classified as Tier-I and all the local centres have the capability of responding 
to such incident with their own equipment and resources. The spills of Tier-II 
between 50 and 500 tonnes are the responsibility of the provincial centres. 
However, the resources and equipment may be required to be mobilised from 
other provincial centres or national centre, in which case national structure is 
activated. In case of Tier-III spills of more than 500 tonnes, the responsibility 
of coordination of response lies with the national authority. Some of the local 
centres which are subject to higher risk of oil spills due to large volumes of oil 
loading / discharge operations, have been equipped with the capability to deal 
with a much larger spill than that mandated in the national plan on the 
direction of national authority. 
 
Thus, there is a well structured organisation for activation of oil pollution 
response. There are significant amount of resources and equipment available 
with PSO as well as the National Iranian Tanker Company. The country also 
has good experience of dealing with large oil spills due to its long drawn out 
conflict with Iraq and the worst oil spill ever during the first gulf war in 1991 
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(ITOPF, 2009c).In addition, a well developed technical expertise is build up 
by regular training of personnel undertaken both in-house as well as with the 
support from the regional organisation existing in the region and the IMO. It 
also has an institutionalised system for conducting exercises at national and 
regional level to fine-tune the system. Thus, over the period of time, an 
efficient response system has been developed in the country for oil spill 
response. The only lacuna in the overall picture, the non ratification of FUND, 
92, has also been rectified and thus is likely to contribute in complementing 
the existing efforts towards setting up better infrastructure. 
 
4.6.2 Oman 
 
The concern regarding protection and preservation of environment has 
historically been part of the national policy in the country since 1984 when 
Oman became the first Arab country to set up a ministry exclusively 
concerned with the environment to give thrust to the implementation of the 
first ever environmental legislation enacted by the Sultanate in 1974 & 1979 
( Oman Embassy, 2009). In line with these policies, the first national oil spill 
contingency plan was promulgated in 1985 which was followed by an update 
in 1992 called the Action Plan for combating marine oil spills. Both of these 
plans were superseded by the Oman national oil spill contingency plan of 1995 
(IMO, 2002). The plan has recently been revised again in 2004 with the 
support from IMO and ITOPF to address the international developments on 
the issues.  
 
The overall responsibility for coordination of response to an oil spill incident 
is entrusted to the erstwhile Ministry of Regional Municipalities, Environment 
and Water Resources which is now shifted to the newly formed Ministry of 
Environment and Climate Affairs (MECA). The response is organised in a 
tiered concept which strangely includes Tier 0. An oil spill with potential 
impact requiring no action under the plan and managed by the polluter is 
classified as Tier 0. Spills of less than 100 tonnes classified as Tier –I  are 
required to be dealt with using local resources while Tier –II spills between 
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100 and 500 tonnes would require assistance from the resources under the plan. 
Tier-III spills of more than 500 tonnes would most likely include seeking of 
international resources (Al-Busaidy, 2008). The organisational structure is 
slightly confusing as there is no distinct agency or centre designated as the 
coordinator at national level other than the concerned ministry. Tier-I incident 
is looked after by the pollution control operations centre (PCOC) of the 
ministry while for Tier-II incident, a higher coordinating committee (HCC) 
consisting of ministerial members belonging to various ministries is convened. 
Any action by the PCOC needs to be approved by the HCC. Tier –III incident 
is considered as a national disaster and thus it is responsibility of National 
Committee for Civil Defence (NCCD) which also consists of the HCC 
members (ITOPF, 2009c).The operational control of the response effort lies 
with the PCOC.  In addition, the Petroleum Development Oman, the main 
exploration and production company in the country also is responsible for 
maintaining adequate response capability along with suitable contingency 
planning in its oil facilities. 
 
 Oman has a considerable quantity of response equipment which is maintained 
by various agencies involved in response operations. Although it has not 
experienced any major oil spill in its region , it has build up technical expertise 
to handle response operations by regular training .Periodic exercises are also 
conducted to test the country’s emergency response with participation from 
national and regional resource agencies, the latest in the series conducted in 
Dec 2008 (Oman MEA, 2008 ).  
 
Incidentally, it is the only country in the region which is a party to all relevant 
IMO instruments, although it ratified the OPRC recently in Jun 2008. Thus, it 
also has the requisite legal framework to support response capability. 
4.6.3 United Arab Emirates 
 
The country is a federation of seven emirates and hence the response 
infrastructure developed in the UAE reflects this political organisation. It was 
quite slow in addressing the concerns about oil pollution despite being a major 
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producer and handler of oil. Incidentally, it was not a party to the primary oil 
spill control instrument , the MARPOL convention for a long time and ratified 
it only recently in 2007. It is yet to ratify OPRC. However, till 1998, the 
national oil company, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) was 
mandated to organise the response around its facilities and a well equipped 
response centre was maintained by ADNOC at Ruwais. There were gaps in the 
strategies for launching response at national and regional level due to absence 
of any other infrastructure and organisation and no contingency planning 
existed against the risks in area. Further, the issue was left to the individual 
emirates with no national focus.  Thus, a federal law on protection and 
development of the environment was promulgated in 1999 which also 
addressed the issue of marine oil pollution. The national contingency plan for 
the control of marine environment pollution was drafted and approved in 2002 
(ITOPF, 2009c). The Federal Environmental Agency (FEA) is responsible for 
coordinating response to the oil spills through six operational oil spill centres 
established around the country. The local facilities dealing with oil have also 
been mandated to have their own contingency plans (McKenzie, 2003). 
 
The response is organised on a tiered structure where Tier-I spills of smaller 
size affecting local area are required to be tackled by the local facility e.g. 
ports, oil companies. Tier-II spills of up to 2000 tonnes are the responsibility 
of individual emirates. However, the response will be organised through a 
committee with members drawn from various stakeholders including FEA, 
local government, ports, oil companies etc. FEA is responsible for Tier-III 
spills affecting more than one emirate and require support of international 
agencies for coordinating response.  
Sufficient quantity of equipment is generally maintained in the country, 
though not only under FEA, but also largely with ADNOC and other 
stakeholders. Incidentally, two out of the six operations centres are operated 
through arrangement with ADNOC (McKenzie, 2003). Adequately trained 
manpower is generally available with the operators of the equipment through 
in- house training but largely under training arrangements with the leading 
industry and regional intergovernmental organisations. The country had 
experienced some oil spills during the Iran-Iraq war, but not with major effects. 
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However, it has started taking part in periodic exercises conducted under the 
regional framework with neighbouring countries. The liability and 
compensation system is also in place to support the response arrangements. 
4.6.4 Saudi Arabia 
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest producer and exporter of oil in the 
world. It lies in an area of the highest traffic congestion in shipping routes in 
the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea. However, it has been slow to address the 
environmental concerns related to oil pollution. Incidentally, it was not a party 
to any major IMO instruments related to marine pollution till recently and has 
ratified the MARPOL and CLC, 92 in 2005. It is yet to become party to other 
important related IMO instruments e.g. OPRC, Intervention. Further, despite 
being a net exporter of oil, it is not a party to FUND convention which 
restricts its capability towards claiming liability and compensation in case of 
an oil spill. 
 
Although the first national oil spill contingency plan was approved in 1991, it 
basically depended on the agencies with marine and coastal facilities or 
activities to develop their own local oil spill contingency plans and provide 
adequate equipment and manpower to organise response (Saber, 1998). Thus, 
the leading oil company, the Saudi Aramco, established a well structured 
response infrastructure with contingency planning, necessary equipment and 
manpower arrangements. The national plan has been revised and now 
designates the Presidency of Meteorology and Environment (PME) as the 
overall coordinator of response arrangements. The response is organised 
through Area Operations Committee and Environment Protection Committee 
with membership of various other government organisations and departments 
(ITOPF, 2009c). 
 
Although it is understood that the response is coordinated on the tiered 
concept, the details about the capability are not available. However, it has the 
largest pollution response capability in the region mainly due to private efforts. 
A significant quantity of equipment is held with PME and various port 
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authorities. In addition, Saudi Aramco maintains a large stockpile of 
equipment. A highly skilled trained manpower is also available mostly due to 
private efforts. Regular large scale exercises are also arranged at national as 
well as international level. The country has gained extensive experience in 
spill response techniques while handling spills during first gulf war. PME and 
Saudi Aramco coordinated a major response effort during which more than 
one million barrels of oil were recovered (ITOPF, 2009c). Thus, despite the 
lacuna in not being a party to OPRC and delay in acceding to other marine 
pollution conventions, it has set up an efficient response mechanism. 
 
4.6.5 Yemen 
 
The country is the lowest producer of oil in the Middle East. However, the 
Gulf of Aden experiences significant oil traffic close to the country. Although 
the details regarding environmental awareness and initiatives by the national 
government are very limited, the country has not been a party to any IMO 
instruments concerning marine pollution other than Intervention Convention 
for a long time and has not even ratified the MARPOL. However, it has 
recently ratified the CLC, 92 in 2006. 
 
The maritime affairs authority has been designated as the agency responsible 
for marine environment and pollution issues. However, there is no formal 
national oil spill contingency plan and there is no statutory requirement for 
ports or oil handling facilities to have such plans in place. Incidentally, a few 
companies have developed their plans on voluntary basis. Thus, in the event of 
an oil spill, no coordinated response is possible and the individual companies 
will be left to deal with such situation. The availability of response equipment 
is extremely limited in the country with only a few sets available with 
government and public agencies. There are also lack of training resources and 
constraints of qualified manpower for undertaking efficient operations (ITOPF, 
2009c). Currently, IMO is acting as a facilitator towards development of a 
national oil spill contingency plan and strengthening of the response 
infrastructure in the country (OSTC, 2009) 
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4.6.6 Qatar 
 
The country is located in the area enclosed by the Arabian Gulf and lies in a 
high risk zone for oil pollution. However, it has not proactively addressed the 
issue and like most of the other countries in the region, it was not a party to 
major IMO instruments on marine pollution for a long period. With the 
encouragement from IMO and the regional organisation operating in area, it 
has ratified MARPOL, OPRC CLC 92 and FUND 92 and is now among the 
few countries to do so. The information about the origins of the response 
mechanism to an oil spill incident has been quite limited. However, there has 
been contingency planning undertaken by the local oil companies and port 
authorities with provision of supporting response infrastructure and equipment. 
Currently, the national contingency plan has been revised in 2005 and is yet to 
be approved by the government (ITOPF, 2009c). 
 
It draws a set up for organising response which is slightly different from the 
conventional one. Although the overall responsibility is designated to the 
Environment Protection Committee (EPC) consisting of members from 
various concerned government and private agencies, most of the infrastructure 
depends on the Qatar Petroleum (QP) resources. It maintains all the response 
equipment and resources and also mans the operations centre for reporting of 
oil spill incidents. Incidentally, the provisions also require QP to provide 
adequate resources to respond to all incidents within the country’s waters 
including its own facilities. The equipment earlier maintained by the port 
authorities have also been transferred to QP (ITOPF, 2009c).  
 
The response for a small spill within a local area is coordinated by the local 
authority with assistance from QP while for larger spills, EPC will convene 
and nominate on scene commander. QP will however, deal with the response 
arrangements (ITOPF, 2009c). QP maintains a considerable stock of 
equipment with arrangements for necessary vessels and helicopter resources. 
The training requirements are met generally using international and regional 
resources and participation in regional exercises is also undertaken regularly to 
improve capability of response organisation. 
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4.6.7 Bahrain 
 
It is an archipelagic country formed of 36 low lying islands located in the 
Arabian Gulf. The national contingency plan for an oil spill has been 
developed but very limited details are available about the implementation of 
response mechanisms. The department of Environment Affairs (DEA) is the 
agency responsible for coordinating response operations which is organised on 
tiered concept with three levels of response. The small spills of Tier-I is 
tackled by the facilities of Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) and port 
authorities with their resources and equipment. However, Tier-II and III is 
coordinated by Director General, DEA through establishment of Incident 
Command Centre. The larger spills are tackled through assistance from 
international resources. A few of the local facilities have their own 
contingency plans in place (ITOPF, 2009c). 
 
DEA has a substantial stockpile of response equipment but there is no 
organised structure for maintenance and training and periodic exercises. For 
the larger spills, resources from private sources will also be tasked to augment 
those from the government. The vessels and aircraft are utilised from a host of 
government agencies including defence forces and coast guard. BAPCO also 
maintains a major stockpile of such equipment. Thus, overall, sufficient 
equipment is available to deal with a medium sized spill in the country. 
 
The country has ratified MARPOL recently in 2007 and is not a party to 
OPRC. However, it is a party to CLC and FUND conventions, thus, 
successfully addressing the liability and compensation issues. 
  
4.6.8 Kuwait 
 
The country lies at the head of the Arabian Gulf and has suffered the worst oil 
pollution incidents ever in the world during the first gulf war in 1991. As with 
the other countries of the region, it was also not a party to the major marine 
pollution conventions of IMO for a considerable period of time and ratified 
MARPOL in 2007 and CLC in 2004. It is yet to ratify OPRC and FUND 
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conventions. The availability of details about response infrastructure is quite 
limited despite the presence of the headquarters of the Regional Organization 
for the Protection of the Marine Environment (ROPME) located in the country. 
Although there is a national contingency plan in place nominating 
Environment Protection Authority (EPA) to be responsible for coordinating 
response, it is organised through a national committee dealing specifically 
with oil issues with members drawn from various government and private 
agencies. A minor spill is dealt with by the local agencies in the area e.g. 
Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), local ports, while the major spills is coordinated 
by the committee using resources from different regions. Further, KOC and 
ports have their own contingency plans to deal with any such incident (ITOPF, 
2009c). 
 
The country has a substantial stock of response equipment maintained by the 
users or operators, who also hold the resources owned by EPA. The 
requirement of vessels and aircraft is met by relevant agencies including KOC, 
ports, defence forces and coast guard. All these authorities have adequately 
trained manpower utilising the resources of the regional organisation and 
participate regularly in the exercises conducted at the national and 
international level. 
 
The country has experienced a large number of oil spills, not necessarily from 
tanker operations or casualties and gained considerable expertise and 
experience in handling response to such situation. 
 
4.6.9 Iraq 
 
 No information is available on current infrastructure and capability as state of 
the existing response mechanism after the gulf wars is not widely available. 
  4.6.10 Jordan 
 
The country is located at the head of Red Sea and has a very small coastline 
with only one major port at Aqaba. It has been slow in developing 
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arrangements for oil spill response and was not a party to many IMO 
instruments on the subject. It has recently ratified MARPOL and OPRC and is 
a party to CLC, 69 and not CLC 92, FUND and Intervention conventions. The 
national contingency plan has been developed but yet to be approved by the 
government. The responsibility for coordinating the response to such an 
incident is given to the Ports Corporation located at Aqaba. The corporation 
has adequate resources and equipment to combat a spill up to 200 tonnes in 
area. Larger spills are responded jointly with the neighbouring countries, 
Egypt and Israel with whom the country has a bilateral arrangement for such 
cooperation (ITOPF, 2009c). 
 
4.7 Industry / Private Capabilities for Oil Spill Response 
4.7.1 National Oil Companies 
 
Most of the major oil companies operating in the region maintain a large 
stockpile of equipment and resources on their own which is essentially much 
bigger than the capability maintained by the government sources. Saudi 
Aramco has the world’s largest stockpile of oil spill response equipment 
among the oil companies in the world which includes specialised vessels, 
aircraft, helicopters and trained personnel (ITOPF, 2009c). ADNOC is 
responsible for stocking and maintaining two out of six national oil spill 
centres in the UAE (McKenzie, 2003). QP also provides almost all of the Tier-
II response equipment available in Qatar and undertakes the operational 
response to any oil spill incident in the country. Petroleum Development 
Oman, National Iranian tanker Company and Bahrain Petroleum Company 
also have considerable capability in their respective areas of operations which 
supplements the national setup. 
4.7.2 Industry Cooperatives 
 
The oil companies operating in area also tend to rely on the services of third 
party private organisations for Tier- II & III response than their respective 
national governmental capabilities. These organisations are generally the oil 
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industry cooperatives (Moller, 1997). Two important organisations operating 
in the region are as follows: 
 
(a) Regional Clean Sea Organisation (RECSO) It is an oil industry 
cooperative organisation formed by 13 major oil companies in the 
region with an objective of launching oil spill response through mutual 
aid by pooling of resources. It has become an important player not only 
in sharing of equipment and resources among the members but also in 
addressing the larger issue of capacity building in the field through 
training of personnel, conduct of joint exercises and providing 
technical support ( RECSO, 2009). 
 
(b) Oil Spill Response Limited (OSRL) All the major oil 
companies are members of this UK based organisation which provides 
full response services including trained manpower, (response team and 
technical advisors), equipment and other resources. It maintains three 
Tier-III pollution response centres at Southampton, Singapore and 
Bahrain respectively. In addition to the resources positioned at Bahrain, 
the equipment from other centres can also be provided within 24 hours, 
if needed. It also undertakes training and capacity building through 
exercises (OSRL, 2009). 
 
4.7.3 Other Trade Associations  
 
The Petroleum Association of Japan (PAJ), a non profit trade association, also 
has a number of stockpiles of oil spill response equipment strategically located 
along the tanker routes from the Middle East to Japan. The equipment can be 
borrowed free of cost whenever needed and returned after cleaning and 
repairing / replacing the damaged items. It has six domestic and five overseas 
bases, two of which are located in the Middle East at Saudi Arabia and Abu 
Dhabi respectively (PAJ, 2008). 
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4.8 Regional Cooperation in Middle East for Oil Spill Response 
 
Although the individual countries in the region were quite slow in developing national 
environmental legislation and ratifying the related IMO instruments, the necessity of 
mutual cooperation to combat oil spills was recognised by them. With the 
encouragement from the UNEP, the following two regional frameworks have been 
worked out:  
4.8.1 PERSGA 
 
It is the Regional Organization for the Conservation of the Environment of the 
Red Sea and Gulf of Aden (PERSGA), which is an intergovernmental 
organisation dedicated to the conservation of the coastal and marine 
environment. It was established consequent to the adoption of the Jeddah 
Convention, formally titled "Regional Convention for the Conservation of the 
Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment" in 1982. Although the convention 
came into force in 1985, the PERSGA was created in 1995 and now provides a 
platform for intergovernmental cooperation on environmental issues. A 
revised PERSGA /IMO action plan for the development of national systems 
and regional mechanisms for preparedness and response to major marine oil 
spills in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden was formulated in Jun 2005 which 
supports development of national plans and systems in the countries that do 
not have these and to establish a regional mechanism for achieving 
coordinated response to any major oil spills. Its members include Saudi Arabia, 
Jordon and Yemen in Middle East and Djibouti, Egypt, Somalia and Sudan in 
Africa. It is not a provider of response equipment and undertakes capacity 
building through technical support and training for implementation of 
necessary measures (PERSGA, 2009). 
4.8.2 ROPME and MEMAC 
 
The Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centre (MEMAC) is based in Bahrain and 
was formed through the Kuwait Action Plan, under the Regional Convention 
for Cooperation on the Protection of Marine Environment from Pollution, 
1978 which provided the background for development of the Regional 
Organisation for the Protection of Marine Environment (ROPME). Thus, 
 74 
MEMAC is the operational centre of ROPME which provides a platform for 
cooperation among members to launch joint efforts against oil spills. It also 
supports revision or development of national contingency planning, relevant 
implementing legislations and technical support through training and exercises. 
The members include Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and UAE (MEMAC, 2009). 
4.9 Strengths and Weakness of Response System in Middle East 
 
The mechanism for delivery of efficient response to an oil spill in this high risk area is 
found to be quite different than the conventional system where the governments 
undertake major responsibility in setting up the infrastructure and resources. Further, 
the countries in the region except a very few, have lagged far behind in ratifying even 
basic IMO instruments concerning marine pollution like MARPOL. Despite recent 
efforts by the regional organisations and the IMO, there is still some lacuna in this 
area. The region has definitely developed an operational model for arranging better 
preparedness and response due to experience with some of the largest oil spills. The 
overall strengths and weaknesses of the oil spill response mechanism are discussed 
below: 
Sr.No Strengths Weaknesses 
1. Contingency Planning 
Major countries in the region have a 
sufficiently well developed 
contingency planning supported by 
regularly updated national plan and 
related local level plans. 
Contingency Planning 
A large number of states do not 
have a valid national contingency 
plan well supported by national 
governmental agency. Yemen does 
not have such a plan in place. 
Jordan has a draft plan yet to be 
approved. 
2. Tiered Response Capability 
The response is generally organised 
clearly in a tiered concept for 
efficient delivery in all the states 
except Qatar, Yemen and Jordan. 
Tiered Response Capability 
In many states, the tiered response 
is not followed properly either due 
to lack of capacity or due to single 
private agency tasked for 
operational response. 
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Sr.No Strengths Weaknesses 
3. Equipment and Resources 
A large stockpile of specialised 
combat equipment including vessels 
and aircraft to launch effective 
response is maintained in the region 
which is generally available for use 
in different states. 
Equipment and Resources 
Very limited equipment and 
resources are available with 
governmental agencies in majority 
of states. Limited equipment and 
resources are available with Yemen. 
4. Competent National Authority 
All countries except Yemen now 
have a clearly defined command 
structure in place with a designated 
national authority for oil spill 
response. 
Competent National Authority 
In most states, the nominated 
authority does not have real control 
which is generally exercised by 
national oil company.  In few 
countries, the command structure 
becomes confusing in Tier-III when 
there is an overlap with the national 
disaster response organisations. 
5. Training and Exercises 
The region has moderate capability 
in having a structured training 
programme and undertakes regular 
exercises at national and 
international level. 
Training and Exercises 
Limited in-house training expertise 
exists in most of the states which 
generally depends on private 
resources or those provided by the 
regional organisation. Limited 
exercises at national or local level. 
6. Regional Cooperation 
Intergovernmental cooperation 
exists at regional level in the form of 
two regional organisations in the 
region. Successful in supporting 
members to improve response 
capability by improving ratification 
of IMO instruments and developing 
national contingency plan. 
Regional Cooperation 
Failure to develop any regional 
contingency plans for the region. 
Cooperation generally limited to 
training and technical support and 
no mechanisms for sharing of 
resources or launching joint 
operations. 
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Sr.No Strengths Weaknesses 
7 OPRC 
The recent efforts by IMO and 
regional organisations have resulted 
in a few states ratifying OPRC. 
OPRC 
Most of the states have not ratified 
the OPRC. A few have recently 
ratified but are yet to implement it 
in national legislation. 
8. Other Issues 
-The region has one of the largest 
capabilities set up by the private 
entities for oil spill response.  
-The provisioning of Tier- II & III 
equipment through industry 
cooperatives ensures quick response 
in bypassing bureaucracy of inter-
governmental organisations. 
Other Issues 
-Despite being a net exporter of oil, 
most of the states have not ratified 
FUND convention which restricts 
liability and compensation claims.  
-Many countries have recently 
ratified MARPOL and there are a 
few states that are yet to ratify this 
basic convention on marine 
pollution. 
 
4.10 Oil Spill Response Measures in the North-east Africa 
 
This group covers the countries that are located along the Red Sea and the Gulf of 
Aden on the north east part of Africa. The countries south of Somalia are considered 
part of the Western Indian Ocean and thus excluded from this study. The countries in 
this group have a similar risk profile as those of the Middle East; however, the 
approach adopted by them is quite different. 
4.10.1 Egypt  
 
The country due to its strategic location in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal had 
been in the forefront in addressing the issue of marine oil pollution. it is one of 
the few countries in the region which has ratified all the relevant IMO 
instruments except FUND convention. The first national oil spill contingency 
plan was prepared in 1986 and then was reviewed and updated in 1998 to 
conform to the requirements of    OPRC. The Egyptian Environmental Affairs 
Agency (EEEA) is designated as the overall coordinator for oil spill response. 
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A National Contingency Planning Committee (NCPC) advises and assists 
EEEA and in the event of a major spill, an Emergency Response Committee 
(ERC) may be convened to advise and assist EEEA (JICA, 2008).  
 
The response is coordinated in a tiered concept. Tier-I spills up to 100 tonnes 
are coordinated by the local facilities with their own resources. In Tier-II spills 
up to 1000 tonnes, EEEA will take responsibility for response but may 
delegate it to another body. Also, Tier-II response originating in petroleum 
sector will continue to be directed by the Egyptian General Petroleum 
Corporation (EGPC) unless it is specifically requested for assistance. Tier-III 
spills of more than 1000 tonnes will be looked after by EEEA and ERC will 
also be convened. A considerable stockpile of equipment is maintained in the 
country with one EEEA response centre and four centres maintained by EGPC. 
In addition, Suez Canal Authority and other ports also possess adequate 
equipment for launching response in their area. The EGPC, Suez Canal 
Authority and Red Sea Authority have been mandated to have their own 
contingency planning for their area (JICA, 2008). The country is capable of 
undertaking in-house training of personnel and carries out regular exercises at 
national and international level. 
4.10.2 Sudan 
 
The country presently does not have any capacity to respond to an oil spill 
incident. Although it has designated the Sudanese Maritime Administration 
Corporation (SMAC) as the national authority for coordinating response, it has 
negligible equipment available in the country(ITOPF,2009c). It also has not 
ratified any of the IMO instruments related to marine pollution including 
MARPOL and has no legal framework in its national legislation for addressing 
marine environmental issues. The regional organisation, PERSGA has 
provided support for developing the national system for oil spill response. In 
the first stage, a national oil spill contingency plan was formulated and has 
now been approved by government in 2004. However, no information is 
available whether any supporting infrastructure in terms of organisation, 
equipment and legislation has been developed to support the plan. 
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4.10.3 Djibouti 
 
The country has relatively been quite responsible in addressing issues 
concerning marine pollution and is among the few countries in the region 
which has ratified all major IMO instruments on this issue. The Maritime 
Affairs Authority (MAA) is designated as the national coordinator for oil 
pollution occurring outside port limits. The national plan for oil spill 
contingency is quite old and was approved in 1990 and has very limited 
information about the response strategies and actions for undertaking an oil 
spill response. The responsibility of coordination is divided among two 
agencies. Oil spills within the ports are handled by port authorities using their 
own resources while those outside are handled by MAA. In addition, local oil 
companies have their own contingency plans along with supporting equipment 
and manpower for their area of operation. A limited number of resources are 
available with the agencies (ITOPF, 2009c). IMO had established a stockpile 
of pollution control and clean up equipment at Djibouti in 1980 with the 
support of Norway, for use in Gulf of Aden waters of Djibouti, Yemen and 
Somalia. However, the operational readiness of this equipment is doubtful. 
Hence, a project has been commissioned by PERSGA for assessment of this 
stockpile and to suggest actions fro making it operationally available for use 
(PERSGA, 2009). 
4.10.4 Eritrea 
 
The political developments in the country and frequent conflicts with 
neighbouring country have affected the overall development. It has restricted 
the national policy in taking due note of the risks of marine oil pollution in the 
area. Incidentally, it has not ratified any of the IMO instruments related to 
marine pollution including MARPOL. Further, limited information is available 
on the response capabilities against an oil spill. A draft national oil and 
noxious substances spill contingency plan was formulated in 1995 in which 
the department of maritime transport was designated as the coordinating 
agency (ITOPF, 2009c). However, no information is available whether any 
supporting infrastructure in terms of organisation, equipment and legislation 
has been developed to support the plan. A negligible quantity of response 
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equipment is held in the country and even sufficient quantity of equipment is 
generally not available with the oil companies. 
4.10.5 Somalia 
 
No information is available regarding any national organisational structure for 
dealing with marine oil pollution. 
 
4.11 Industry / Private Capabilities for Oil Spill Response 
 
Egypt is the only country in the region which has adequate response capability while 
other countries have negligible resources. The majority of equipment in Egypt is 
maintained by EGPC which has four centres for Tier –II response with necessary 
equipment and resources. In addition, Suez Canal Authority has significant stocks 
including lightering barges and tugs available for use outside the canal. Port 
authorities also have specialised equipment at four main ports to launch quick 
response (ITOPF, 2009c). 
 
4.12 Regional Cooperation in North Eastern Africa for Oil Spill Response 
 
All countries except Eritrea are members of the PERSGA, the details of which are 
mentioned at Para   4.8.1. However, the development of cooperation is quite slow due 
to political factors.  
 
4.13 Strengths and Weakness of Response System in North Eastern Africa 
 
Out of the five countries of the region, only Egypt has a well developed infrastructure 
for oil spill response while a minimal structure might also exist in Djibouti. There is 
no such capability in Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia. Incidentally, these three countries 
do not have any national legal framework supporting marine pollution response and 
are not party to any of the IMO instruments on the subject. Thus, overall there is no 
capability for response in major part of the region. The lack of any effective 
cooperative arrangement at regional level also excludes the possibility of addressing 
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this lacuna by seeking assistance of countries lying on the east coast of Red Sea, 
mainly Saudi Arabia. 
 
4.14 Oil Spill Response Arrangements in Other Oceanic Areas 
 
The capability of oil spill response in northern Indian Ocean in the three sub groups 
discussed in this dissertation can be compared and contrasted with those in other 
similar sub regions in the world. The arrangements in two such regions are 
summarised below: 
  4.14.1 North Sea 
 
The agreement for cooperation in dealing with pollution of the North Sea 
(Bonn Agreement) is the mechanism by which the North Sea states provide 
mutual assistance to each other in combating pollution. Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and UK are the members of 
this agreement.  
 
 
Figure 17 : Area covered by Bonn Agreement. 
 
Source: http://www.bonnagreement.org/,2009 
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All these countries have a well developed national oil spill response 
mechanism. This includes a contingency plan which is comprehensive and 
updated regularly with clearly defined organisational structure and 
responsibilities, necessary stockpile of equipment and resources, well trained 
and exercised personnel and legislative arrangements for supporting current 
liability and compensation regime. However, to address the need for creating a 
joint response structure for a large spill, a regional cooperation agreement has 
been developed which is operational. The area has been divided into eight 
zones for the purpose of oil spill monitoring and control and supervisory 
responsibilities have been assigned to various states. The operational 
arrangements of cooperation have been codified in the Counter Pollution 
Manual which is updated regularly. The details of equipment and resources is 
maintained and a state can request assistance from other state which is obliged 
to comply with the request and fully support the operations of the requesting 
state. However, the requesting state will reimburse the cost of these resources 
to the assisting state. Detailed arrangements are already worked out regarding 
command and control, procedures, financial costs, communication, other 
administrative and operational issues. The guidelines for joint surveillance are 
also in place. A database of all national capabilities and arrangements is 
maintained and updated regularly. Arrangements for joint training and 
exercises have been institutionalised and utilised frequently (Bonn Agreement, 
2009). 
 
Thus, the efficiency of response in this region is very high compared to the 
three subgroups in Northern Indian Ocean due to competent national 
arrangements supported by strong regional cooperation among the states.  
4.14.2 Baltic Sea 
 
The Baltic Sea is one of the most important sea area threatened by marine 
pollution. Thus, the convention for the protection of the marine environment 
of the Baltic Sea area was developed in 1974 and revised in 1992. The 
governing body of the convention is the Helsinki Commission- Baltic Marine 
Environment Protection Commission- also known as HELCOM. The member 
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states to HELCOM are Demark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Russia and Sweden.  
 
All these countries have a well developed national oil spill response 
mechanism. This includes a contingency plan which is comprehensive and 
updated regularly with clearly defined organisational structure and 
responsibilities, necessary stockpile of equipment and resources, well trained 
and exercised personnel and legislative arrangements for supporting current 
liability and compensation regime. 
 
Figure 18 : Area covered by HELCOM. 
 
Source: http://www.helcom.fi/,2009 
 
Regional cooperation is worked out by a group called HELCOM Response. 
An arrangement similar to the one mentioned at Para 4.14.1 in Bonn 
Agreement also exists in this area (HELCOM, 2009). 
 
Thus, the efficiency of response in this region is also very high compared to 
the three subgroups in Northern Indian Ocean due to competent national 
arrangements supported by strong regional cooperation among the states. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1   Conclusion 
 
This dissertation attempted to address the issue of response to a marine oil spill 
incident in the Northern Indian Ocean region. At the outset, the background of oil 
emerging as a premier source of energy and its need for transportation over the sea 
was looked into to understand the origin of the issue. It has been found that oil has 
progressively become the major source of energy in all the regions of the world since 
its discovery and is likely to continue for a long time. The geographical distribution of 
oil rich countries away from the major oil consuming nations has generated the need 
for transportation of a large quantity of oil from the producers to consumers. Due to 
its cost effectiveness and suitability to provide logistical link between different 
continents separated by oceans, shipping has emerged as the primary source of 
transportation of this oil. Further, the development of offshore oil exploration and 
production facilities has also contributed to the oil coming in close contact with 
marine environment. The problem of oil pollution especially in marine environment in 
the initial years was met with strategies to prevent the intentional spillages of oil and 
oily wastes within harbours and areas located close to the coastline. Further, the 
problem was considered more as a nuisance than having any long term environmental 
or health hazards. 
 
However, over the period of time, it has been understood that oil pollution has much 
larger effect on the marine environment. The overall effect varies greatly depending 
on different types of ecosystems.  The short term effects include loss of animal and 
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plant species, fish and other fisheries resources while there may be serious long term 
effects in terms of loss of breeding grounds, impairment of food cycle and loss of 
habitat. Apart from these environmental effects, there are large economical costs 
concerning contamination of coastal amenities, industries and tourism. It has been 
found during the research that shipping or maritime transport is not the major source 
of the oil entering into the sea and land based sources account for a much larger share. 
However, due to the risk of an extremely large quantity of oil likely to be released in a 
small area in case of a marine casualty, the public attention definitely focuses on the 
shipping as a major source of such pollution.  
 
 The efforts to deal with this problem include setting up of a global mechanism which 
addresses not only the intentional discharges but also the accidental pollution. 
Incidentally, the thrust towards the development of such mechanism was given by the 
oil spill resulting from the Torrey Canyon disaster. Thus, IMO became a forum for 
supporting development of international instruments to address this issue. The focus 
of this effort was both on preventive as well as response measures. The regulating 
framework has been supported by the primary IMO convention on marine pollution, 
MARPOL and later augmented by OPRC. However, important parameters of the 
mechanism concerning operational practices, design standards of ships and right of 
intervention by the coastal state in case of threat of oil pollution, are also relevant and 
provided by SOLAS and Intervention Conventions respectively. The major problem 
in the implementation of an efficient response framework for an oil spill incident 
involves costs of funding the equipment and resources and the clean up operations. 
Thus , a suitable three tiered liability and compensation regime has been developed 
through CLC and FUND conventions and its relevant protocols to enable recovery of 
costs from the polluter on globally recognised ‘Polluter Pays’ principle. 
 
The author considers that although there is a difference between the preventive and 
response measures to an oil spill incident, a clear distinction cannot be made between 
them as there is certainly an overlap between the two. To develop an effective 
response mechanism, the availability of legislative framework to support the response 
organisation along with suitable liability and compensation mechanisms is as much 
necessary as the provisioning of contingency planning, combat equipment, resources 
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and infrastructure. Thus, the study of the efficiency of any response mechanism in 
such a case would only be complete by addressing all these aspects. 
 
The next step in the research was to develop a risk profile for an oil pollution incident 
in the northern Indian Ocean. The essential ingredients for a risk situation are a 
combination of the probability of occurrence of a hazardous situation and the 
consequences of that occurrence. This dissertation has identified a number of factors 
that contribute towards developing this risk profile. 
 
The main oil producing countries of the world are located in the area and two 
important transportation routes for oil tankers pass through the region which carries 
about two-thirds of the global seaborne oil trade. Although there are not many marine 
casualties experienced, a significant quantity of oil enters into the sea through 
operational discharges from ships. A majority of global ship recycling yards are 
operating in the Indian subcontinent and hence there is steady flow of ships transiting 
the area on their last voyages. Many of these ships are not seaworthy and pose a threat 
for collision or grounding especially in severe weather conditions leading to oil 
pollution from the ships they collide with. However, no major accidents involving 
such ships have been reported. 
 
The region also has ecologically sensitive and fragile ecosystems located in many 
countries surrounding the area. These include mangrove areas home to one of the 
largest number of species and coastal & backwater lagoons, mudflats and estuaries. 
The coral areas are reported to contain one of the largest numbers of species in the 
region. Any major oil spill in the area will certainly have a drastic effect on these 
ecosystems. The region also experiences seasonal rough weather affecting ocean areas. 
 
The countries in the region generally have limited implementation of pollution 
prevention measures thereby increasing the risk of an oil spill. These include less 
stringent FSI and PSC inspection and regime, inadequate reception facilities in ports 
and lack of strong enforcement mechanism. The lack of resources in these developing 
nations has also greatly resulted in degrading the public concern about environmental 
issues in general and oil pollution in particular. Thus, the national policies reflect 
focus on developmental issues rather than oil pollution. 
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A number of geo-political factors have also been identified that impinge on the risk 
situation. The political and diplomatic considerations have led to conflicts, war and 
hostilities. Incidentally, this was the cause of the largest oil spill ever experienced in 
the world during the first gulf war in 1991 when Iraqi soldiers deliberately dumped 
thousands of tonnes of oil into the sea. The presence of a failed state, Somalia, poses a 
gap in implementation of measures against risk of pollution. It has also led to the 
region becoming the hotspot for piracy attacks. Although these attacks have not 
resulted in any oil pollution incident, the use of heavy military weapons by the pirates 
may sometimes result in damage to the ship leading to pollution. The risk of terrorist 
attacks in this area is quite real with two such attacks witnessed on USS Cole and 
tanker Limburg in Gulf of Aden. 
 
A critical analysis of these factors was undertaken by the author and it was found that 
various factors have different weightage on the probability and consequences part of 
the risk matrix with some having low probability but high consequences and vice 
versa. Further, the area has certain regions, especially in the Middle East, where the 
risk is relatively higher than others. Overall the risk of a major oil spill incident in the 
region is estimated to be a medium risk. 
 
To study the oil spill response mechanisms in the Northern Indian Ocean, the author 
divided the area into three subgroups namely South Asia, Middle East and North-
eastern Africa. It was observed that these subgroups have distinct factors affecting 
them in terms of existing risk, economic development, political set up and enclosed or 
open ocean areas. This arrangement also helped in studying the regional arrangements 
among the countries as these are generally based on geographical locations. 
 
During the research for the dissertation, it was observed that the Northern Indian 
Ocean has not been given sufficient attention by the scholars and researchers 
compared to other oceanic areas of the world. Incidentally, the information and data 
availability regarding marine oil pollution was not only larger in traditional developed 
regions in Europe and North America but also in East Asia and Western Indian Ocean 
islands.  Further, most of the information available related to the technical aspects of 
oil pollution rather than administrative or operational set up in the countries or the 
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region. Hence, the author attempted to cover these gaps by soliciting information 
directly from the national maritime administrations, oil spill response agencies, and 
national environmental agencies, regional organisations working in the field of oil 
pollution, academic institutions and ocean research institutes. Although it was quite 
demanding and cumbersome process, it succeeded in generating significant quantity 
of information concerning the issue. However, there are still certain areas with 
insufficient information. 
 
The capability of the states was examined basically on four factors - organisational 
structure with designation of responsibilities for launching response, comprehensive 
plan addressing all contingencies, availability of adequate equipment & other 
resources and technical expertise in terms of adequately trained personnel.  A few 
other factors were also looked into to support the findings. The existing set up of 
regional cooperative arrangements along with capabilities available with industry and 
private entities was also considered. Based on these factors, the strengths and 
weaknesses in the existing mechanisms were identified separately in each sub region. 
 
The analysis of the South Asian region brings out that all countries, except India, have 
a very limited capability of response. While Maldives does not have any capability, 
Pakistan has recently started instituting the required framework after experiencing a 
major disaster in the Tasman Spirit oil spill. Sri Lanka, on other hand, has the 
implementing mechanism in place but lacks sufficient equipment and resources. India 
being the largest country in the region has adequate resources and a well developed 
organisation structure to respond to Tier –II spills up to 10000 tonnes. Although, there 
are no formal cooperative arrangements at regional level, informal cooperation exists 
between the countries to support joint operations. There is no private capability in any 
country except in India where a significant number of private agencies and contractors 
maintain response equipment stockpiles. The national legal set up and the ratification 
of relevant IMO instruments is satisfactory with relatively few gaps. However, greater 
thrust is needed in implementing liability and compensation measures in all countries 
except India. 
 
The Middle East sub- region is the most important area among the three groups in this 
study due to the highest risk experienced. The analysis of the capabilities of various 
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countries presents an interesting picture. Although, the region has witnessed some of 
the largest oil spills in the world, and is home to a large number of major oil 
producing and exporting countries, it is quite strange that the issue of marine oil 
pollution was not provided the required attention. The majority of the countries have 
been quite slow to establish a mechanism for oil spill response and were not party to 
even the basic IMO convention related to marine pollution, MARPOL for a 
considerable period of time. Due to the efforts of IMO and the regional organisations 
operating in area, this lacuna has been addressed and many of them have now become 
party to MARPOL and other relevant conventions. However, this aspect still leaves a 
lot to be desired. Another peculiar finding of the study was that despite being a net 
exporter of oil and thus facing almost negligible contribution costs, many countries 
have not become a party to FUND convention which restricts their ability to recover 
costs in oil spill response concerning third party liability. 
 
 The organising structure for oil spill response in many countries, although well 
defined, still leaves a few gaps in implementation as the designated national 
coordinator does not have the required capability and thus does not effectively control 
the operations. It is the national oil companies or other organisations, which are 
essentially controlling the operations. In Qatar, UAE and Oman, the respective 
national oil company has a much larger capability than the national coordinator and 
also effectively coordinates the operations. In Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Aramco 
maintains a much larger inventory of equipment and resources than government 
coordinator.  Thus, it is generally observed that the national coordinator provides only 
guidance while the operational control is given to operating facilities. However, this 
system has a lacuna in a sense that the companies focus on their own requirements 
and do not essentially cater for a contingency plan at national level. Thus, in case of a 
tanker accident outside these facilities within national waters, the organisational 
response would be severely restricted. Limited information about current status of 
implementation of measures for oil spill response was available for Yemen, Bahrain 
and UAE while no information was available for Iraq. However, Yemen is the only 
country other than Iraq which is yet to ratify MARPOL and other relevant IMO 
instruments on the subject. 
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There are two regional organisations established in the area, PERSGA and ROPME, 
which provide a framework for cooperative arrangements among the countries. The 
efforts have been basically restricted to training and exercises, technical support and 
other administrative arrangements rather than sharing of resources or launching joint 
operations. However, these organisations, with the support from IMO, have been 
successful in encouraging members to become party to IMO instruments and assisting 
in strengthening of national response infrastructure through development of 
contingency plan and other supporting structure in the countries that do not have these 
arrangements. 
 
The study also found that there is quite significant capability existing with the private 
entities. Incidentally, Saudi Aramco maintains the largest stockpile of equipment 
among the private operators worldwide. There are also cooperative arrangements 
among the oil companies operating in area under RECSO for mutual sharing of 
resources and at global level with OSRL which also maintains a Tier –III oil spill 
response centre in Bahrain. In addition, the PAJ also has two stockpiles in the region 
at Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia and six others located worldwide along the tanker 
route to Japan which can be requisitioned by these oil companies. Thus, overall the 
industry has access to a large inventory of equipment and resources. The author 
considers that these cooperative arrangements are much more effective than the inter-
governmental cooperative arrangements due to less bureaucratic approach, quick 
response time and free from political and commercial issues. 
 
Thus, the study highlights that the approach followed by the countries in this region is 
different than the conventional approach where the governmental agencies remain a 
dominant player in the oil spill response infrastructure in a country. In this case, the 
major oil companies have a much larger role in organising response and contributing 
resources than in other regions. The region is found to have sufficient capability to 
respond to larger oil spills complementing adequately the high risk situation. However,  
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the existing lacunae in implementation of recently ratified IMO conventions and gaps 
in capabilities of a few countries may affect the efficient delivery of response to a 
large oil spill involving such countries. 
 
The North eastern African region presents an interesting contrast to the other two sub 
regions in our study. While Somalia can obviously be disregarded in our study due to 
absence of political entity administering the country, Eritrea has witnessed many 
conflicts since independence which has seriously affected development efforts. This 
has resulted in total lack of any effort towards marine conservation issues including 
oil pollution .Sudan   has also been focussing more on basic developmental activities 
than environmental issues due to lack of resources. Incidentally, Eritrea and Sudan are 
not a party to any of the IMO instruments related to marine pollution. 
 
Djibouti is the only country which is party to all the relevant IMO instruments on the 
subject. However, very limited information is available about the implementation of 
these instruments in national domain. It has negligible capability to organise a 
response to an oil spill incident due to lack of resources.  Egypt is the only country in 
this region with sufficient response capability. There is a clear defined organisational 
structure with contingency planning arrangements. However, the majority of 
equipment and resources are maintained by the major oil company. 
 
With no capability existing in a major part of the region, the regional cooperative 
arrangements have limited role in seeking joint operations or mutual assistance and 
focuses on establishing a framework of response infrastructure in these countries 
through technical and financial assistance. Overall, the capability to launch an 
effective oil spill response is negligible or non- existent in most of the region except 
around the coast of Egypt. 
 
Thus the capability of the three regions in Northern Indian Ocean can be summarised 
in Figure 19. 
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MEDIUM RISK– MODERATE 
CAPABILITY
HIGH RISK – HIGH CAPABILITY
HIGH RISK  - NO CAPABILITY
 
Figure 19 : Capability of oil spill response in Northern Indian Ocean. 
 
Source: Author, 2009 
 
The status of ratification of conventions on oil pollution in the region is placed at 
Appendix ‘C’. 
 
The capabilities in two other oceanic regions, North Sea and Baltic Sea, were also 
looked into to compare the mechanism in responding to oil spills. It has been found 
that unlike in Northern Indian Ocean, all the countries in these regions are highly 
proactive in ratifying relevant IMO instruments and developing a national response 
infrastructure. The most notable difference between the two systems is the highly 
developed regional cooperation which is functioning at operational level with sharing 
of resources and equipment.  The significant difference between the development 
standards of the countries of Europe in comparison to countries of Northern Indian 
Ocean makes it unsuitable to use this set up for comparison and analysis. However, 
certain nuances of cooperative arrangements can be utilised to make a rational 
judgement about effectiveness of regional organisations. 
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5.2 Recommendations 
 
(a) There is a need for evolving formal cooperative arrangements at 
regional level in South Asia. As most of the countries other than India have 
limited resources and expertise, this would benefit in improving the overall 
system of response not only in respective individual countries by gaining from 
Indian experience, but also at regional level in organising joint response. The 
current regional plan worked out under the auspices of UNEP South Asian 
Seas Programme needs to be operationalised without further delay. 
 
(b) A special initiative needs to be considered by the IMO and PERSGA to 
build up national capacity of North-eastern African states on priority to 
address the large gap in response capabilities in a high risk region. 
 
(c) It is recommended to explore feasibility to provide financial as well as 
technical support to the developing nations challenged by lack of resources, 
through international organisations like IMO, UNEP, regional organisations 
and industry associations. The provision of developmental funding especially 
is critical for sustainability of any mechanism for non- priority areas in their 
context like environment protection. 
 
(d) The old stockpile of oil spill combating equipment provisioned through 
IMO at Djibouti needs to be operationalised without any delay to be available 
for use in the Gulf of Aden.  
 
(e) Regional cooperative arrangements need to be worked out in the region 
for operational level activities similar to those existing in the North Sea or 
Baltic Sea enabling sharing of resources and launching joint operations in 
addition to the existing arrangements for training and capacity building. 
 
(f) A special initiative needs to be considered by regional organisations in 
Middle East to encourage improvement in liability and compensation 
mechanisms in individual countries by ratification of FUND convention. 
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(g)  There is a need for developing the national coordinating authority for 
oil spill response towards accepting greater role and responsibility in the 
Middle East. This will reduce the confusion in command and control structure 
during response operation and prepare suitable ground for successful 
implementation of the national contingency plan in all areas.  
 
(h) Article 6 of OPRC calls for parties to provide information to IMO 
about the details regarding the competent national authority responsible for oil 
pollution preparedness and response, availability of response equipment & 
expertise and the national contingency plan. However, none of the countries in 
the region, which are party to the OPRC, have done so. There is a need for the 
countries in the region to provide such information to IMO to encourage 
mutual cooperation through dissemination of requisite information to all 
concerned. 
 
 (i)  A further research is recommended for addressing specific topics 
affecting overall response capabilities in the region in areas of national 
legislative framework and contingency planning arrangements. 
  
 (j) During the research, it was found that there is no global database 
maintained for recording all marine oil pollution incidents. While ITOPF data 
is generally used for guidance even by IMO, it covers oil spills caused by oil 
tankers and not by any other ships. Oil Spill Intelligence Report - International 
Oil Spill Database is also known to maintain a database of oil spills in the 
world from all sources. However, it is not widely available and does not 
sufficiently address the requirement. Thus, there is a need for such a database 
to be maintained by any shipping or marine organisations e.g. International 
Chamber of Shipping (ICS).  
 
The response to a marine oil spill is a complex process involving a combination of 
operational capability and the supporting administrative and legislative framework. 
The challenge of balancing the developmental needs in a developing country with the 
requirement of addressing the environmental concerns cannot be resolved 
comprehensively. The argument for considering their effects on the ability of a 
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country to effectively develop and implement any mechanism addressing these 
concerns has a sound basis but has not been explored for resolution. The conventional 
response organisation structure calling for a dominant role of a governmental agency 
is also being challenged by new arrangements developing increased reliability on 
private efforts. The Northern Indian Ocean needs an increased focus from the 
surrounding states and the regional & international bodies towards a more responsible 
approach about the oil pollution issue.  
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Appendix – A 
 
 
PROPERTIES OF OIL INFLUENCING ITS BEHAVIOUR AT SEA 
 
 
1. Specific Gravity The specific gravity of oil is its 
density in relation to pure water. 
Most oils are lighter than water and 
have a specific gravity below 1.  
2. Distillation 
Characteristics 
The distillation characteristics of oil 
describe its volatility. As the 
temperature of oil is raised, different 
components reach their boiling point 
in turn and are distilled. The 
distillation characteristics are 
expressed as the proportions of the 
parent oil which distill within given 
temperature ranges. 
3. Viscosity The viscosity of oil is its resistance to 
flow. High viscosity oils flow with 
difficulty whilst those with low 
viscosities are highly fluid. 
Viscosities decrease at higher 
temperatures and so sea water 
temperature and the extent to which 
the oil can absorb heat from the sun 
are important considerations. 
4. Pour Point The pour point is the temperature 
below which oil will not flow. If the 
ambient temperature is below the 
pour point, the oil will essentially 
behave as a solid. 
 
 
 
Source: Response to marine oil spills, ITOPF, 1987. 
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Appendix – B 
 
LIST OF MAJOR OIL SPILLS FROM TANKERS* 
 
 
South Asia 
 
Vessel 
Name 
Quantity Spilled Country Year Cause 
Tonnes Type 
Tasman 
Spirit 
30,000 Crude Pakistan 2003 Grounding 
Cretan Star 29,000 Crude India 1976 Hull Failure 
Cherry 
Vinstra 
16,000 Crude India 1974 Hull Defect 
Aviles 11,000 White 
Product 
India 1979 Fire/Explosion 
Transhuron 5,200 Crude India 1974 Grounding 
 
 
Middle East 
 
Vessel 
Name 
Quantity Spilled Country Year Cause 
Tonnes Type 
Nova 70,000 Crude Iran 1985 Collision 
Assimi 52,500 Crude Oman 1983 Fire/Explosion 
Pericles G 
C 
46,000 Crude Qatar 1983 Fire/Explosion 
Seki 16,000 White 
Product 
UAE 1994 Collision 
Pontoon 
300 
5,500 Crude UAE 1998 Sinking 
 
 
North-eastern Africa 
 
Vessel 
Name 
Quantity Spilled Country Year Cause 
Tonnes Type 
Limburg 12,200 Crude Gulf of 
Aden 
2002 Terrorist 
Attack 
 
* Over 5000 tonnes since 1974. 
Source: ITOPF, 2009. 
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Appendix - C 
 
STATUS OF RATIFICATION OF CONVENTIONS ON OIL POLLUTION 
 
South Asia 
 
 
Middle East 
 
 
 
 
North-eastern Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMO, 2009 
 
Country MARPOL OPRC CLC FUND Intervention 
India Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Maldives Yes  Yes Yes  
Pakistan Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Srilanka Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Country MARPOL OPRC CLC FUND Intervention 
Bahrain Yes  Yes Yes  
Iran  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Iraq      
Jordon Yes      
Kuwait Yes  Yes  Yes 
Oman Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Qatar Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
S.Arabia Yes  Yes   
UAE Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Yemen   Yes  Yes 
Country MARPOL OPRC CLC FUND Intervention 
Djibouti Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Egypt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Eritrea      
Somalia      
Sudan      
